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INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Gillian E. Metzger* & Kevin M. Stack**
Abstract
For years, administrative law has been identified as the external review of
agency action, primarily by courts. Following in the footsteps of pioneering
administrative law scholars, a growing body of recent scholarship has begun to
attend to the role of internal norms and structures in controlling agency action. This Article offers a conceptual and historical account of these internal
forces as internal administrative law. Internal administrative law consists of
the internal directives, guidance, and organizational forms through which
agencies structure the discretion of their employees and presidents control the
workings of the executive branch. It is the critical means for shaping the discretion of officials and ensuring accountability within agencies. Internal administrative law’s binding status in structuring agency decision marks it as a
form of law.
This Article’s project is one of recovery more than invention. The decade-long
debate culminating in enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
reflected consistent recognition of internal controls’ contributions to agency
accountability. Despite this history, judicial enforcement of the APA undermined internal administrative law and constrained its content by treating the
agency’s articulation of internal norms that bind agency actors as triggering
external judicial enforcement. At the same time, expanded White House control has made internal administrative law more centralized. Given the importance of internal administrative law to agency accountability and
administrative legitimacy, the time has come for more sustained engagement
with the idea of internal administrative law and measures to foster its
development.
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Introduction
To the parties in United States v. Texas,1 the Obama Administration’s
immigration initiatives2 represented either unilateral presidential usurpation
1. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
2. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
León Rodriguez, Dir. of U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with
Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents
3–5 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_de
ferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/LEC8-259V]; see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs
& Border Prot. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma
.cc/8JWQ-7RNQ].
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of lawmaking power or simply the standard executive tasks of statutory implementation and priority setting.3 The Supreme Court split on which of
these diametrically opposed accounts to adopt, affirming the Fifth Circuit’s
invalidation of the initiatives by an equally divided Court.4 But from an alternative perspective, the initiatives were not just about the scope of presidential power. Instead, they raised a question that is central to modern
administrative governance: What is, or should be, the role of internal administrative law in the U.S. administrative state?
Agencies act in myriad ways. Many are externally focused and aim at
creating rights and imposing duties that bind third parties outside the
agency.5 Others, however, have an internal focus, targeting agency staff and
operations or the executive branch more broadly.6 Needless to say, no clear
line differentiates these two; the internal and external dimensions of administrative action are closely linked and often hard to separate. Nonetheless,
increasingly the internal, agency-facing sides of agency action are rising to
the fore.
The immigration initiatives, enforcement policies adopted by the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), were paradigmatic
examples of internal administrative law. Adopted outside of notice-andcomment rulemaking, the policies identified several categories of undocumented aliens as priorities for deportation and others as eligible to apply for
deportation relief.7 Although these polices had a major impact on individuals outside of the executive branch—with an estimated five million aliens
qualifying for deferred action—they were ostensibly aimed at DHS personnel and announced in the form of internal memoranda from the secretary to
the heads of DHS’s immigration units.8
More and more, presidents and executive branch officials rely on internal issuances and internal administration to achieve policy goals and govern
effectively.9 The causes of this agency move to internal administration are
3. Compare Brief for the State Respondents at 76, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674),
2016 WL 1213267, at *76 (arguing that the executive had unilaterally ignored immigration
statutes), with Brief for the Petitioners at 74–75, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674), 2016 WL
836758, at *74–75 (arguing that the executive complied with immigration law in creating enforcement priorities).
4. See Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272, aff’g by an equally divided court 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015).
5. See, e.g., What We Do, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/
KY7P-3HLN] (listing major categories of external-facing actions taken by the NLRB, including
conducting elections, investigating charges, facilitating settlements, deciding cases, and enforcing orders).
6. See, e.g., Casehandling Manuals Pts. 1–3, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/manuals [https://perma.cc/7RS9-3WAW] (providing detailed procedural and operational guidance to NLRB regional directors and their staffs for their use in addressing unfair
labor practice and representation matters).
7. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 2.
8. See id.; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 2.
9. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1849
(2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Duty to Supervise] (“Systemic administration and supervision . . .
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varied: Most prominent perhaps is the overall trend towards administrative
governance in response to polarized politics and legislative gridlock, a trend
evident in growing reliance on regulatory measures in general, and not just
on internal administrative law.10 Other factors include searching judicial review and transformations in the form of regulation, such as greater privatization and devolution or the rising importance of national security and
crisis governance.11 Whatever the cause, the growing centrality of internal
administration is evident across a broad range of substantive areas. To give
just a few examples: interagency arrangements are important parts of recent
environmental and financial regulation and national security initiatives;12
guidance and enforcement policy play an increasingly central role in education and employment contexts;13 and administrative oversight, negotiated
are becoming even more important in contemporary regulatory and administrative
contexts . . . .”).
10. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1176–77 (2014) (describing internal White House review of agency
decisions as a consequence of polarized politics); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 17–62 (2014) (describing how congressional gridlock
has spurred agencies to employ existing statutes creatively to address new policy challenges);
Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 Forum 3, 5 (2014) (describing congressional
gridlock as encouraging increased use of executive power).
11. See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking,
92 Cornell L. Rev. 397, 408 (2007) [hereinafter Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries] (noting
that the risk of an adverse judicial ruling increases agency incentives to use policymaking
mechanisms not subject to judicial review); Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at
1849–58 (noting the importance of systemic administration and internal measures such as
oversight in privatization, devolution, national security, and crisis governance contexts).
12. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, EPA-DOE-FERC Coordination on Implementation of the Clean Power Plan (2015), https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2015/
CPP-EPA-DOE-FERC.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT58-WMMG] (environmental regulation); U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15-81, Dodd-Frank Regulations: Regulators’ Analytical and Coordination Efforts 14–15 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667633
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TMN-B5DM] (financial regulation); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi,
Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1169–73 (2012) (fuel
economy standards); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 211, 221–26, 228–29
(2015) [hereinafter Renan, Pooling Powers] (national security).
13. See, e.g., U.S. DEP ’T OF LA B O R , SEVERE VIOLATOR ENFORCEMENT PR O G R A M 3–4
(2013), http://www.osha.gov/dep/enforcement/svep_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2Y
P-G5S9] (describing criteria for enhanced OSHA enforcement); Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dear Colleague
Letter on Transgender Rights 1 (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6K9-Q3NL] (“This guidance does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to
inform recipients about how the Departments evaluate whether covered entities are complying
with their legal obligations.”); Renan, Pooling Powers, supra note 12, at 229–30 (describing
interagency taskforce and initiative that combines environmental, FLSA, and criminal enforcement). On the increasing centrality of enforcement policy to regulation and presidential
power, see Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1031, 1069–71
(2013).
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agreements, and funding protocols have significantly affected the shape of
contemporary federalism.14 Equally, if not more, significant is the growing
number of issuances from centralized entities like the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) and its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), governing everything from regulatory promulgation and analysis to
agency use of guidance, budgeting, enforcement policy, and peer review.15
Administrative law scholarship has also gone internal. Agency design
and coordination, centralized White House control, the civil service and internal separation of powers, internal supervision, the role of agency guidance—these are just some of the topics now receiving sustained scholarly
analysis.16 By focusing on the internal life of agencies, today’s scholars are
retracing the steps of administrative law pioneers at the turn of the nineteenth century.17 They are also heeding the insights of Jerry Mashaw, who
emphasized the importance of internal agency administration decades
before it was popular.18
But while administrative law scholarship and administrative reality have
turned internal, the same is not true of administrative law as it is generally
understood. The reigning model for administrative law doctrine continues
14. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va. L.
Rev. 953, 971–72 (2016) (identifying the importance of federal-state administrative negotiation, intergovernmental agreements, and supervision in a range of federalism contexts);
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 154, 189–93 (2011)
(describing antidiscrimination requirements for states’ disbursement of federal funds).
15. See Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, OMB Bull. No. 07-02, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Final Bulletin]; Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, M-05-03, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg.
2664 (Jan. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review];
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget (2016) [hereinafter Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget].
16. The array of recent scholarship on these themes makes any comprehensive list impossible. For a few noteworthy works, see Rachel E. Barkow, Foreword, Overseeing Agency
Enforcement, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1129 (2016); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (2006); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12; Elizabeth Magill & Adrian
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 Yale L.J. 1032 (2011); Jon D. Michaels, An
Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (2015); Jennifer Nou, IntraAgency Coordination, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 468–71 (2015) [hereinafter Nou, Intra-Agency
Coordination]; Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
Yale L.J. 2182, 2207–42 (2016); and Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (2003).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 34–46.
18. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims 1–17, 213–17 (1983) [hereinafter Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice]; Jerry
L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the
Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
Cornell L. Rev. 772, 802 (1974).
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to be external constraints on agencies imposed by Congress and the courts.19
Under this model, internal administrative measures are often painted as unlawful efforts by agencies to evade external legal restrictions. Here again, the
immigration initiatives are Exhibit A: in Texas v. United States both the federal district court and the Fifth Circuit held that DHS memos violated the
externally imposed procedural constraints on agency action contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).20 Another prime example is the frequent complaint that agencies are using guidance and other forms of internal law to evade the procedural requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.21
Even when not portrayed as violating the APA, however, key features of
internal administration—internal policies, procedures, practices, oversight
mechanisms, and the like—are rarely viewed as part of administrative law.22
Just as public administration and administrative law are distinguished as academic fields, so too are they viewed as distinct phenomena in the life of
administrative agencies. The longstanding distinction between “law” and
“politics” reinforces the sense that internal measures, often driven by policy
concerns and political imperatives, should be excluded from the legal side of
the ledger.23
Our goal in this Article is to offer a full-throated account of internal
administrative law that challenges this received administration–law divide.
We argue that many internal measures, ranging from substantive guidelines
to management structures that allow for oversight of agency operations,
qualify as forms of law. These measures not only bind and are perceived as
binding by agency officials; they also encourage consistency, predictability,
and reasoned argument in agency decisionmaking.24 They frequently involve
19. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost
One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 313 (2012) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Creating the Administrative Constitution]; Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law
Misunderstands How Government Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 Washburn L.J.
1, 1 (2013).
20. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 671
(S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016) (mem.).
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. See Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 19, at 278,
313.
23. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic (2010); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev.
1381, 1424 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, supra).
24. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, 1122–23 (2013); Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1985,
1993–2017 (2015) [hereinafter Stack, Administrative Jurisprudence] (defending rule of law
principles of administrative governance); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43
Ga. L. Rev. 1, 6–9 (2008) (describing the influence of norms in institutions with the rule of
law).
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traditional lawmaking activity, including interpretation and enforcement of
statutes, regulations, executive orders, treaties, and the Constitution.25 Put
together, they have many of the paradigmatic features of legal norms even if
they lack the element of enforcement through independent courts. In arguing for the legal nature of internal administration, we are following and
expanding upon the work of Jerry Mashaw, who—himself drawing on the
early work of Bruce Wyman—has long advocated recognizing the status and
importance of internal administrative law.26
Acknowledging the lawlike character of internal administration still
leaves the concern that such internal measures are nonetheless unlawful because they undermine and conflict with external law, and in particular the
APA. As a result, exploring internal administrative law’s relationship to the
APA is essential for assessing its current status and legitimacy. Building on
our previous work on the internal administrative law and the APA,27 we
argue that, far from condemning internal administrative law, the APA embraced it. Preserving space for internal administrative law was an important
goal of the APA and the compromise that it represented.28 Unfortunately,
this feature of the APA is one that courts often have ignored. Through several different doctrinal routes, courts have gradually occluded the APA’s
openings for internal administrative law and transformed internal measures
into externally enforced constraints. At the same time, pressures for centralized White House control have led to the displacement of agencies’ own
internal law into versions of internal law that stem from central offices
within the executive branch.
The history of internal administrative law’s treatment under the APA
carries broader jurisprudential and structural lessons. One lesson concerns
the inherent tension of a joint internal and external law regime.29 Once internal aspects of agency functioning become subject to external as well as
25. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103
Geo. L.J. 259, 268–70 (2015) (examining OIRA practice as a form of executive lawmaking);
Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace,
1960 to the Present, 96 Va. L. Rev. 799, 800–01 (2010) (discussing administrative
constitutionalism).
26. See Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, supra note 18, at 9–15, 213 (evaluating internal law of administration that guides administrators as a basis for administrative justice);
Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 22, at 223 (emphasizing
the importance of a “robust internal law of administration”).
27. See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law Before and After
the APA, in Administrative Law from the Inside Out: Essays on Themes in the Work of
Jerry L. Mashaw 163 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
28. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950) (“[The APA] settles longcontinued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and
political forces have come to rest.”).
29. Scholars are increasingly suggesting the need to link internal and external constraints
on agencies. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 426 (2009) [hereinafter Metzger, Internal and
External Separation of Powers]; Michaels, supra note 16, at 537–53 (describing the impact of
intra-agency separation of powers on external actors).
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internal regulation, these two forms of law are brought into closer connection and potential competition. With judicial enforcement of agency internal
law dramatically constricting the room available for internal law, in both its
agency-specific and more centralized forms, the net result may undermine
rather than enhance systemic administrative legality. A second lesson is that
the externalization of internal administrative law is a predictable response to
the growth and entrenchment of the modern national administrative state
and corresponding concerns to cabin administrative discretion.30 Those concerns have increasingly surfaced of late, with the national government’s turn
to administration as a response to partisan polarization and legislative
gridlock.31 As a result, the pressures to expand external administrative law
are only likely to grow.32
These dynamics create an urgent need to bring internal administrative
law into the administrative law fold. Recognition of internal administrative
law and the critical role it plays is essential to assess whether expansions of
administrative government should be a source of concern—and if so,
whether greater external constraints on agencies is the right response. To
some extent, this recognition can be achieved by combining a revised historical account that acknowledges internal law’s centrality to the APA system
with statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal reforms that allow internal law to
flourish. But a true embrace of internal administrative law requires more. It
requires breaking down the current conceptual and institutional divide between administration and administrative law. A legal regime that envisions
external control as the only protection against administrative abuse is fundamentally at odds with the logic of contemporary administrative governance.
Such a regime will never be able to ease anxieties about the administrative
state or successfully regulate the exercise of administrative power. Instead,
core internal features of agencies—such as management structures, guidance, planning and coordination, civil service, professionalism, and the
like—need to be recognized as central to administrative law, as they once
were in administrative law’s early years. As administrative law scholars are

30. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 20–23
(1990).
31. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 957–67; Farber & O’Connell, supra note 10, at
1176–77; Freeman & Spence, supra note 10, at 2–5.
32. In this regard, it is worth noting that over eighty administrative reform bills were
proposed during the 114th Congress (2015–2016). See Memorandum from ACUS Interns to
Reeve Bull, Research Chief, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Regulatory and Administrative
Reform Legislation (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regulatory%20Reform%20Legislation%20Memo%2012-5-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7LU-R489].
Moreover, enactment of an omnibus measure containing most of these measures was an early
priority of the new House of Representatives. Lisa Lambert, Republicans Pass Sweeping Bill to
Reform ‘Abusive’ U.S. Regulation, Reuters (Jan. 11, 2017, 7:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-congress-regulations-idUSKBN14W02N [https://perma.cc/Q9YW-KNPY].
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increasingly realizing, administration needs to be recovered as part of the
field of administrative law.33
The recent 2016 elections only reinforce the need for serious consideration of internal administrative law. To be sure, the federal government is
now under unified Republican control, easing the incentive to resort to administrative power created by congressional gridlock.34 But deep partisan
division and significant obstacles to legislative enactment remain.35 Moreover, a presidential transition involving transfer in party control of the executive branch, particularly one marked by a new administration’s deep
opposition to the policies of its predecessor, inevitably will entail significant
internal executive branch action to reverse existing administrative measures.
Internal administrative law will be central to those efforts, especially for actions that are not subject to external procedural requirements.36 Indeed,
early indications from the transition suggest that not just Obama Administration policies and regulations, but also longstanding executive branch
practices and structures may be vulnerable to change during the Trump Administration.37 Such a prospect might make those committed to our current
33. For earlier works that particularly stress the need to link administration and administrative law, see, for example, Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 Admin. L.
Rev. 673 (2007) (arguing Chevron misunderstands public administration as statutory interpretation); Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119
Yale L.J. 1362 (2010) (using the Gilded Age as focus for exploration of administration and its
overlapping regimes of accountability, including legal accountability); Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9; Michaels, supra note 16; Robert C. Moe & Robert S. Gilmour, Rediscovering
Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected Foundations of Public Law, 55 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 135 (1995) (discussing tensions between public administration as a legal and managerial
enterprise); Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, supra note 16; Daphna Renan, The Fourth
Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1039, 1098–99 (2016) [hereinafter
Renan, Fourth Amendment] (arguing that administrative law insufficiently addresses agency
action that takes nonlegislative form); and Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future
of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. Miami L. Rev.
577, 577–78 (2011) (arguing that internal and external oversight strategies should complement
each other).
34. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, House Clears Path for Repeal of Health Law,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/us/politics/affordable-careact-congress-budget.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
35. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Unparalleled Resistance Looms for Trump After Inauguration,
Wall St. J.: Wash. Wire (Jan. 10, 2017, 7:26 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2017/01/10/
unparalleled-resistance-looms-for-trump-after-the-inaugural [https://perma.cc/D7Y7-QSY8];
David Stid, Why the GOP Congress Will Stop Trump from Going Too Far, Wash. Monthly,
http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/januaryfebruary-2017/why-the-gop-congress-willstop-trump-from-going-too-far [https://perma.cc/C9L3-DVFL].
36. E.g., Jordan Fabian & Jonathan Easley, What Trump Can Accomplish on Day One,
Hill (Jan. 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/313140-whattrump-can-accomplish-on-day-one [https://perma.cc/TUH9-C6ZN].
37. E.g., Coral Davenport, Climate Change Conversations Are Targeted in Questionnaire to
Energy Department, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/politics/climate-change-energy-department-donald-trump-transition.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing efforts by the Trump transition to obtain information on career
Energy Department staff involvement in climate change); Arden Farhi, Will Donald Trump
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administrative state wary of expanding recognition of internal administrative law at this juncture, for fear of how such law might be used. Yet the
concern that certain judicial review doctrines undermine internal administrative law and agencies’ ability to function effectively retains traction notwithstanding a change in White House control. Equally important, we
emphasize that internal administrative law both empowers and constrains.
The constraints imposed by internal administrative law will be critical in
resisting unlawful or excessive assertions of administrative power now, just
as they have been in the past. Those constraints depend on recognition of
internal administrative law’s legitimacy for their continued vitality.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I takes on the task of describing
internal administrative law and justifying its status as law. It begins with
setting out the wide ambit of measures that internal administrative law encompasses. The most commonly recognized forms of internal administrative
law are the processes, guidelines, and policy issuances that an administrative
agency adopts to structure the actions of its own officials.38 Yet internal
management structures, which allow for oversight of agency operations and
enforcement of policies specified by agency heads, also constitute internal
administrative law. Nor is internal administrative law limited to measures
that exist within an agency. Transagency measures, in particular centralized
White House oversight and coordination mechanisms, also qualify. This Part
then defends the lawlike nature of these internal measures, emphasizing how
they often involve traditional lawmaking activities and fit the criteria frequently invoked as essential to law. They are recognized as binding, and are
critical for realizing traditional rule-of-law values of consistency, certainty,
transparency, and reason giving. Part I concludes by identifying the role internal administrative law plays in realizing other demands on agencies, including their political accountability, managerial efficacy, and compliance
with external legal demands.
Part II turns to examining internal administrative law’s relationship to
the APA. It looks at the decade-long debate on administrative reform, starting with the New Deal and leading up to the APA’s enactment, to assess the
role of internal law. This debate reveals a consistent and keen understanding
of the central place of internal administrative law. While the eventual compromise struck in the APA placed greater external constraints on agencies,

Shut Down Any Federal Agencies?, CBS News (Nov. 23, 2016, 1:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/will-donald-trump-shut-down-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/3CSP-XYCV]
(noting it is unlikely that President Trump would act on his campaign promises to abolish the
EPA and Department of Education); Jeremy Venook, The Trump Administration’s Conflicts of
Interest: A Crib Sheet, Atlantic (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2017/01/trumps-appointees-conflicts-of-interest-a-crib-sheet/512711 [https://perma.cc/B4TD2RH3] (describing the Trump Administration’s apparent deviations from longstanding conflict of interest norms and requirements).
38. See Mashaw, supra note 22, at 252–54; Bruce Wyman, The Principles of the
Administrative Law Governing the Relations of Public Officers § 53, at 185
(Lawbook Exchange ed. 2014) (1903).
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the APA did not seek to significantly displace or preempt internal administrative law but instead to preserve room for internal law’s ongoing development. The APA required that internal administrative law be published but
expressly exempted internal law from its procedural demands.
Part III then takes the story forward, looking at developments since the
APA’s enactment. Here, a very different picture emerges. A cluster of judicial
doctrines has undermined the place of internal administrative law and constrained its content. Under these doctrines, the more that agencies articulate
norms of internal law and management in a way that sounds binding or
mandatory, the more they invite external judicial review of their actions.
Agencies thus have an incentive to engage in subterfuge; to avoid external
enforcement of their internal law, their internal norm setting is pushed to
higher levels of generality and must deny that it seeks to constrain the discretion of agency actors. Equally important, the significant expansion of
White House control over the executive branch has made internal administrative law much more centralized and less agency specific.
Part IV turns to reform. It asks how to best foster internal administrative law and restore its status to that conceived by the APA. One obvious
route is to seek reform through external administrative law—new statutes or
doctrinal changes that would restore space for internal administrative law
and perhaps even encourage its development. But neither Congress nor the
courts have shown much interest in developing internal administrative law
in recent years—and questions exist as to the courts’ competency to do so
even if so inclined. We then take up a second route of reform, focusing
internally on the president and agencies. Here, we outline areas for improvement with regard to how recent presidents have handled internal law, which
provide an opportunity and challenge for the incoming administration. Ultimately these doctrinal and institutional efforts involve a conceptual and
rhetorical reorientation: they entail challenging the popular and legal discourse that views administration as a persistent threat, not a system capable
of law self-governance.
I. Internal Administrative Law
The meaning of “internal administrative law” seems at first intuitive.
According to one standard definition, administrative law “comprises the
body of general rules and principles, governing administrative agencies—
governing both how they do their own work, and how the results of that
work will be viewed, or reviewed, by the President, Congress, and the
Courts.”39 Internal administrative law would seem simply that part of administrative law that occurs inside administrative agencies.
Yet on further reflection, the move to take administrative law internal is
not so simple. What counts as internal administrative law can vary widely on
several dimensions, such as content, source, audience, and scope. Measures
39. Peter Strauss et al., Gelhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases and
Comments 11 (11th ed. 2011).
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could represent internal administrative law because they govern actions
within an agency, originate from within an agency, are aimed at an intraagency audience, or some combination thereof. Internal administrative law
could be limited in scope to measures that address only one agency or additionally encompass requirements that apply to the executive branch more
broadly. This variation raises important definitional issues at the outset. A
further set of questions concerns why internal agency measures should be
considered law at all, and why internal administrative law is a category worthy of study and emphasis in the first place.
We take up these foundational questions in turn here, beginning with a
description of the types of internal administrative law evident today and
how the early distinction between internal and external administrative law
has shifted over time. We next turn to defending internal administrative law
as a form of law, and finally to identifying the crucial role it plays in advancing an agency’s policy priorities and ensuring administrative accountability.
A. Categories and Varieties of Internal Administrative Law
Internal administrative law is not a novel concept. Over nearly twenty
years, Jerry Mashaw has sought to move internal administrative law to the
center of administrative law.40 As part of this effort, Mashaw excavated from
near obscurity the work of Bruce Wyman. Wyman was one of the first administrative law teachers at Harvard Law School, and his early twentiethcentury treatise on administrative law helped create administrative law as a
distinct field.41 Wyman’s treatise was built around a distinction between the
internal and external law of administration. Wyman argued that “internal
administrative law,” not the external law of administration, was the “real
subject” of inquiry.42
Wyman’s treatise thus provides the fount and logical starting point for
the project of evaluating internal administrative law.43 For Wyman, external
and internal administrative law differed in terms of their content: external
administrative law concerned “the relations of the administration or of officers with citizens,”44 while internal administrative law addressed “the relations of officers with each other, or with the administration.”45 Under
Wyman’s conception, internal administrative law consisted of the norms
governing allocation of authority among the many actors within an agency
and the practices by which their individual actions constitute collective action on the agency’s behalf. Wyman saw that this law could be both written
40. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, supra note 18, at 1–17. For a helpful recent step in
this direction, see Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 463 (2012).
41. Kevin M. Stack, Reclaiming the “Real Subject” of Administrative Law, Introduction to
Wyman, supra note 38, at III [hereinafter Stack, Introduction to Wyman].
42. Wyman, supra note 38, § 4, at 14.
43. Stack, Introduction to Wyman, supra note 41, at XXIV.
44. Wyman, supra note 38, § 2, at 4.
45. Id. §§ 2, 4, at 4, 14.
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and unwritten. In its unwritten form, Wyman included “usages . . . established in every department”46 that have the “force of law”47 and operate as
“precedents”48 in orderly administration. Wyman recognized that internal
administrative law in this unwritten form is sometimes discernible primarily
as social fact or institutional practice—that is, part of what organizes individuals into collective or institutional action.49 Wyman viewed internal law
as having normative as well as positive content: it was concerned with the
“proper” relations among officials,50 and it established norms from which
agencies or officials had to justify departures.51
When Wyman developed these distinctions at the beginning of the
twentieth century, external administrative law was focused on judicial review
and consisted of the common law mechanisms by which citizens could obtain relief from pubic officers for violation of their legal rights.52 Over time,
however, external administrative law expanded in scope to include a broad
set of controls imposed on agencies.53 As a result of the enactment of a wave
of legislation that regulates administrative agencies—from the APA to the
Information Quality Act—internal and external law can no longer be distinguished by their content, as they were for Wyman. Today, both internal and
external administrative law may address the internal functioning of agencies,
such as the procedures agencies must follow or the factors they must consider in their decisionmaking. The distinction between the two instead rests
largely on source and scope: internal administrative law consists of measures
governing agency functioning that are created within the agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government personnel. Although
external administrative law similarly targets agency functioning, it comes
largely from Congress and the courts and has a wider audience and binding
effect—governing courts, private actors, and other interested outside parties
as well as agency officials.54 Yet the overlap of subject matter between internal and external administrative law means that today no clear line demarcates the two. Instead they are best identified as constituting a spectrum. At
one extreme, internal administrative law has the agency as its sole source,
46. Id. § 100, at 296.
47. Id. § 100, at 298.
48. Id. § 102, at 303.
49. Id. § 6, at 22–23.
50. Id. § 6, at 22.
51. Other leading administrative law scholars of the time, in particular Ernst Freund and
Frank Goodnow, similarly underscored its importance. See Frank J. Goodnow, The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States 5 (1905); Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, in 1 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 452, 454–55 (Edwin R.A. Seligman &
Alvin Johnson eds., 1930).
52. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 19, at 252–53;
Wyman, supra note 38, § 3, at 9–13.
53. See Mashaw, supra note 33, at 1366–67; Shapiro et al., supra note 40, at 464.
54. This restriction parallels the doctrinal distinction between legislative rules, which
must be issued using notice-and-comment rulemaking and create legal rights and responsibilities outside the agency, and interpretive guidance. See infra Section III.A. As noted below,
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object, and audience; at the other, external administrative law originates in
statutes or judicial decisions, and imposes restrictions and obligations on
agencies and private actors alike. But there are many points in between—for
example, when agencies issue policy statements that appear aimed both internally and externally or impose internal procedural requirements that have
an external effect.55
Much internal administrative law is still agency specific in the sense that
it is adopted by an agency (or subpart of it) to govern its own conduct. The
most easily recognized forms of internal administrative law today are the
processes and guidelines that a particular agency adopts to structure the actions of its own officials and employees.56 Take, for example, the process the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses for developing recommendations for national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.57
Although the Act imposes some procedural and substantive requirements, it
leaves substantial room for the agency to decide how to proceed, and the
EPA designed an elaborate process for decisionmaking.58 Agencies also promulgate vast numbers of internal guidelines, instructing agency personnel
on matters ranging from reimbursement to inspections to the meaning of
governing statutes.59 Prime examples here include the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration’s Field Operations Manual or the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Provider Reimbursement Manual, which
contain detailed instructions how agency personnel should conduct inspections and enforcement and the meaning of governing statutes.60 These
interpretive guidance is a paradigmatic form of internal administrative law. See infra Section
III.A.2.
55. A prime example of the former are the Obama Administration’s memoranda setting
out criteria for granting deferred action to categories of immigrants in the country unlawfully.
These were documents directed to immigration officials and employees, but plainly anticipated
that immigrants in these categories would respond by filing applications for deferred action
status. See memoranda cited supra note 2. As for internal procedures with external effect, see
Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 927
(2014) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Plan B Fiasco], for a description of the FDA’s deviation from
usual internal procedures for approving moving a drug to over-the-counter status with respect
to Plan B and the additional judicial scrutiny this deviation triggered.
56. See Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 22, at
252–54; Wyman, supra note 38, § 53, at 185.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
58. Wendy Wagner, Science in the Administrative Process: A Study of Agency
Decisionmaking Approaches 19–31 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/CORScience-Project-Report-2-27-12-CIRCULATED-TO-COMMITTEE_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/
DZU3-5Q9M]; see Pasky Pascual et al., Making Method Visible: Improving the Quality of Science-Based Regulation, 2 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 429, 465–68 (2013); see also Jennifer
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755, 1782 (2013)
(noting agency discretion to choose from available regulatory instruments and procedures).
59. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1468–69 (1992)
(noting that “publication rules” such as technical guidelines and staff manuals are far more
voluminous than formal rules).
60. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPL 02-00159, Field Operations Manual (2015), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_
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manuals are promulgated within agencies, usually without public participation; they are aimed at agency employees charged with implementing statutes and regulatory schemes; and they address key aspects of agency
functioning.
Yet internal administrative law as we conceive of it goes beyond process
and policy issuances. It also includes the organizational forms agencies
adopt to govern their own operations. Statutes may stipulate some basic details of agency structure, such as specific divisions or departments61 and requirements for key agency personnel.62 But a large number of agency
oversight and review structures are agency created, ranging from informal
rules governing what decisions an employee must run past her manager to
formal complaint mechanisms to express requirements of sign-off by different subunits or high-level approval for certain decisions.63 These internal
administrative structures, deeply bureaucratic in character, are central to
controlling the actions of agency personnel and determining how the agency
operates.64 The legal importance of administrative structures is an insight
that early administrative scholars well recognized, but that then faded from
view as administrative law grew more focused on courts and public administration developed into a separate field of inquiry.65
As this suggests, the range of internal administrative law is substantial.
Agencies generate a vast amount of rules, procedures, and specifications
02-00-159.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2BX-V28J]; The Provider Reimbursement Manual – Part 1,
CMS.gov, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-BasedManuals-Items/CMS021929.html [https://perma.cc/9R6R-ZYAC].
61. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7403(a)(4) (requiring establishment of technical advisory committees on air pollution); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process: Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431,
445–68 (1989) (detailing changes in statutorily required structures for EPA regulation of air
pollution).
62. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82
S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 927–30 (2009) (noting statutory constraints on who can be appointed to
agency leadership).
63. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2328–30 (2006) (internal mechanisms for staff to
note disagreement with agency decision); Nou, Intra-Agency Cooperation, supra note 16, at
467–71 (describing internal clearance procedures); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 53, 92–103 (describing tools
available to ensure agency staff compliance); see also, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United
States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-7.000 (1997) (setting authorization procedure for electronic
surveillance).
64. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution, supra note 19, at 7; Nina
A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 Cornell L. Rev.
397, 409 (2007) (noting that agencies rely on handbooks, directives and other internal guidance documents to make more consistent and predictable decisions); Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2075
(2005) (arguing that agencies’ internal monitoring is essential for accountability).
65. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1517, 1520–34 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Public Administration and ACUS].
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geared at agency personnel to govern how they undertake their jobs and to
supervise their actions.66 Some are officially promulgated and clearly identified as internally binding requirements; others emerge over time and take
the form of unwritten norms and practices, as Wyman argued.67 Some are
obviously significant from a policy and agency-governance perspective and
the subject of extensive deliberation, like the rules governing when and how
U.S. attorneys can obtain wiretap authorizations.68 Others are picayune and
mindlessly bureaucratic, such as requirements regarding how employees apply for vacation time.69 Yet all of these measures share the key characteristics
of internal administrative law: they are measures generated by agencies to
control their own actions and operations and aimed primarily at agency
personnel. Rather than arbitrarily excluding certain measures from qualifying as internal administrative law, it seems more intellectually honest to recognize that internal administrative law contains a range of measures, some
more significant for understanding how agencies function and approach
their governance tasks than others.
In fact, the scope of internal administrative law is broader still, because
it also includes executive branch measures that are not agency specific in the
sense of adopted by an agency (or an agency subpart) to govern the agency’s
own conduct. It also includes the processes and policies governing interagency interactions, which similarly represent agency-generated efforts
aimed at agency actors that seek to control how the agencies at issue function. Sometimes these processes and policies are jointly constructed, as when
different agencies enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that
govern their interactions.70 In other contexts, one agency may issue the procedures and policies that govern interagency engagement, and still in others,
interagency processes may be governed more by uncodified conventions and
norms.71 Such interagency engagements often have a distinct substantive

66. See sources cited supra note 64.
67. See Wyman, supra note 38, §§ 99–101, at 294–303 (“It is the obvious fact that the
rules governing administration are both written and unwritten . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 19,
at 5–10 (describing theories of the role of informal agency norms).
68. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).
69. Fact Sheet: Annual Leave (General Information), OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/
policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/leave-administration/fact-sheets/annual-leave/ [https://perma
.cc/7S73-88YP].
70. See sources cited supra note 12 for recent examples of MOUs.
71. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1155–73 (describing various methods of
agency coordination); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 199
(2011) (providing examples of statutory mandates for inter-agency cooperation); Bijal Shah,
Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 805, 820–22 (2015)
(describing structures in which agencies share adjudicatory responsibilities); Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1215-17 (2013) (describing
convention of independent agency coordination with the White House); Daphna Renan, The
Law Presidents Make (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Renan, Law
Presidents Make].
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flavor, involving agencies with similar or shared statutory responsibilities.72
But the fact that they are generated outside of an agency’s confines does not
take away from their fundamental internal character; a distinctive feature of
these agreements is that they do not involve action by Congress, the courts,
or other parties external to the executive branch.
By the same token, the spectrum of internal administrative law extends
even further, to measures that emanate from central executive branch actors,
such as the president, OIRA, and the attorney general.73 These centralized
issuances take familiar forms like executive orders, memoranda, bulletins,
and circulars. They direct, guide, and inform how agencies operate and apply across the executive branch as a whole.74 In their general and transsubstantive character, these measures perhaps most closely parallel external
administrative law, yet their internal executive branch status is a critical feature of their role as mechanisms for presidential control. These issuances are
also tools of management, a means by which centralized executive branch
actors control the myriad area-specific agencies that make up the executive
branch.75 These issuances thus represent internal administrative law in a
twofold sense: both as controls on agency action that emanate from within
72. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 12, at 1147–49 (describing agency coordination
challenges in food safety, financial regulation, and border patrol); Marisam, supra note 71, at
187–90 (describing situations that produce overlapping statutory authority); Shah, supra note
71, at 814–20 (describing overlapping agency roles in immigration policy).
73. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 268–70 (noting that traditional administrative
law has tended to underemphasize the role of centralized executive regulatory oversight); see
also Exec. Order 12,250, 28 C.F.R. 298 (1981) (delegating to the attorney general responsibility
for coordinating implementation and enforcement of Title VI and other civil rights statutes by
federal agencies), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 note (2012); Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Title VI Legal Manual (2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/
934826/download [https://perma.cc/FS6L-JPBV] (summarizing DOJ guidance and directives
to federal agencies for implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
74. See, e.g., Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 643
(1994) (imposing principles of regulation on agencies and creating a structure of review of
agency regulation and planned regulatory actions), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012);
Reducing Regulations and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771, § 3(d), 82
Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (requiring agencies to comply with Director of OMB’s cap on
the total cost the agency’s regulations may impose). Further examples abound, such as OMB
Circulars A4 and A76, setting out requirements for how agencies should conduct the regulatory analysis required by Executive Order No. 12,866 and requirements for when agencies
should contract this out. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President,
Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of
the President, Circular A-76 Revised, Performance of Commercial Activities (2003).
See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2272–99
(2001) (describing varieties of formal tools of presidential control under Presidents Reagan,
George H.W. Bush, and Clinton); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114
Mich. L. Rev. 683, 693–719 (2016) (providing a detailed account of control mechanisms
employed by Presidents George W. Bush and Obama).
75. See Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1892–93 (noting role of presidential
managerial accountability through hierarchical forms of supervision); cf. Rubin, supra note 64,
at 2120–24 (describing the mechanism of managerial accountability within agencies).
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the executive branch and as requirements that force agencies to generate new
internal processes, organization, and policy.
The preeminent example of this form of internal administrative law is
Executive Order No. 12,866,76 which sets out the system of centralized regulatory review. In addition to creating a detailed process under which agencies must submit their proposed and final rules to OIRA for review,
Executive Order No. 12,866 also requires agencies to undertake cost-benefit
analysis of certain rules, have regulatory policy officers involved at each stage
of the regulatory process, develop a regulatory agenda, determine what their
regulatory priorities are in the short-term, and coordinate with other agencies.77 Yet another prominent example is the OMB’s 2007 Final Bulletin for
Good Guidance Practices, which stipulates procedures that agencies must follow in promulgating significant agency guidance, including both intraagency
hierarchal review and centralized review by OMB.78
B. Internal Administrative Law as Law
Internal administrative law thus includes internal procedures for agency
action, structures of internal agency organization and allocation of authority, specifications for how agency actors are to make evaluations or conduct
analysis, guidance about the agency’s understanding of what statutes and
regulations mean, informal agency practices, interagency agreements and
norms, and centrally generated cross-cutting requirements for agency action. Having defined what we mean by internal administrative law, a central
question rises to the fore: Why should we see this broad range of internal
issuances and structures as law? Why not see it as simply administration and
bureaucracy?
1. The Characteristics and Values of Law
One important reason to call these measures law is that they share key
characteristics and functions associated with law. A fundamental characteristic of law is that it provides content-independent reasons for action;79 the
fact that a norm is a legal norm supplies the agent to whom it is directed a
76. 3 C.F.R. 638.
77. Id.
78. Final Bulletin, supra note 15. Further examples abound, such as OMB Circulars
A4 and A76, setting out requirements for how agencies should conduct the regulatory analysis
required by Executive Order No. 12,866 and requirements for when agencies contract out.
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-4, Regulatory
Analysis (2003); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular
A-76 Revised, Performance of Commercial Activities (2003); see also Pasachoff, supra
note 16, at 2207–43 (describing OMB’s control of agency policymaking through the budget
process).
79. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist
Approach to Legal Theory 120–23 (2001) (providing account of law’s claim to provide
content independent reasons for action); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 35 (1986).
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reason to comply with its terms. The point is sometimes put even more
strongly: norms must be thought independently binding to count as law.
Scholars take different views on the extent to which and ways a norm
must bind to count as law. Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison offer a very
inclusive view. On their account, a norm operates as a constraint “when it
exerts some force on decisionmaking because of its status as law.”80 From
this perspective, so long as internal administrative norms provide agency
officials a reason for action—even if not a particularly strong reason, much
less a decisive one—the norm would have sufficient constraint or authority
to constitute law. At the opposite extreme, some scholars take the view that
law provides preemptory or exclusive reason for action—that is, that the
norm’s status as law displaces other reasons for action.81 From this perspective, the existence of an internal norm would have to supplant and exclude
other reasons for action for internal administrative law to count as law. In
between these two positions is the idea that a norm’s legal status provides a
presumptively overriding (or presumptively primary) reason for action. The
presumption might be overcome by other particularly strong reasons, but
law is not just one reason among many possible considerations. Instead, this
view makes a more stringent demand, requiring the norm be treated as
mandatory and departed from only with significant justification.82
We need not definitively resolve this dispute regarding how binding or
authoritative a norm must be to qualify as law. It is enough to note that as a
mode of internal ordering within hierarchical structures, internal administrative law provides at least a presumptively overriding (or presumptively
primary) reason for action—the middle point of this rough continuum.
Whether or not they agree with internal administrative law on the merits,
lower-level agency officials consider themselves bound to follow the edicts of
higher-level agency personnel.83 The extent to which internal administrative
law binds agency leadership is more debatable; certainly, there are many
instances of agency leaders deviating from established agency policy and

80. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 24, at 1122 (emphasis omitted).
81. See H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory 253
(1982) (providing account of authority what would “preclude or cut off independent deliberation”); see also Coleman, supra note 79, at 121 (characterizing Hart’s conception of preemptory reasons as those that “foreclose deliberation”).
82. This view is close to that of Joseph Raz who views legal authority as preempting
deliberation about the basis for the authority (so called dependent reasons), but not precluding deliberation about whether to comply in light of the overall demands on the agent. See
Raz, supra note 79, at 46, 57–62 (defending law as providing preemptive reasons); see also
Coleman, supra note 79, at 122 (providing account of Raz’s conception of preemptive reasons); Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 827, 838–39
(1989).
83. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787-1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1261–62 (2006); see also Marissa Martino Golden, What
Motivates Bureaucrats?: Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years
(2000).
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practices.84 The scope of constraint that internal administrative law imposes
on the president is even harder to determine.85 But the assessment of internal administrative law’s bindingness should not be made at the upper echelon of the executive branch. Below this level, agencies’ hierarchical and
supervisory structures ground the force of internal administrative law: internal administrative law will have as much authority as those who issue it have
over those to whom it is directed.
Although such bindingness is critical, it is not the only feature that renders internal administrative measures lawlike. These measures also often advance other values traditionally associated with the rule of law—specifically
the values of authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural
fairness.86 Internal administrative structures and issuances help identify the
official policies of the agency, often identifying the authorization under
which the agency itself acts in the process. In so doing, these internal measures provide the public and agency staff with notice of the agency’s views,
including the reasons for the agency’s position. These internal mechanisms
also foster coherent and consistent approaches to policy and implementation
across the agency and often impose processes that regularize the agency’s
decisionmaking.87 Indeed, for those skeptical of the lawfulness of agency action and internal measures, recognizing the ways in which internal measures
84. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1277–78 (2006) (describing OIRA’s shift toward more proactive intervention in rulemaking); John Leonard Watson, The “New” OSHA: Reinventing Worker
Safety and Health, 12 Nat. Resources & Env’t 183, 183–84 (1998) (describing implementation of a variety of new agency practices).
85. Compare Posner & Vermeule, supra note 23, at 89, with Bradley & Morrison, supra
note 24, at 1132–37.
86. Stack, Administrative Jurisprudence, supra note 24, at 1990–93 (defending these rule
of law principles as most relevant to administrative government). Another feature often identified as necessary for law is generality. But whether law must be general is quite contestable.
Generality is to central to rules. Not all law takes the form of rules, however, a fact particularly
true of law within the executive branch. As Brian Tamanaha has argued, requiring generality
“leaves out much of law” in this context, including enabling acts, measures abolishing or restructuring an agency, or appropriations. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Theory of Law in the Age of
Organizations 5–8 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 16-0703, 2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808774 [https://perma.cc/
8RZC-BMGY]. Even Lon Fuller, an advocate of the generality of law with respect to law that
affects private rights, argued that in the context of affairs between managing and subordinate
government officials, the virtue of generality is a matter of expediency. Lon L. Fuller, The
Morality of Law 208 (rev. ed. 1969).
87. For our purposes here, it suffices to note that internal administrative law advances
these rule of law values. A further project is to rethink what the rule of law should mean
within agencies, where there is a debate about which values and what way are most important
to agencies. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics and Law
for the Modern State 198–203 (2005) (arguing that regularity and consistency are less
important in administrative contexts, where agencies are faced with the challenge of implementing multiple statutes each of which represents political compromises); Leighton McDonald, The Rule of Law in the ‘New Regulatory State’, 33 Common L. World Rev. 197, 215–21
(2004) (arguing that the rule of law needs to be reconceptualized, not rejected, to address new
schemes of collaborative and decentralized governance); Stack, Administrative Jurisprudence,
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can serve the rule of law may prove most important in demonstrating their
legitimacy.
2. Externality Is Not a Precondition for Law
Internal administrative law not only structures and constrains how
agencies act, but is also an integral part of the process of by which acknowledged forms of law—statutes and judicial decisions—are interpreted and
implemented within the agency.88 Given all of this, the more puzzling question is really why hasn’t the legal character of these internal measures been
broadly recognized? Put differently, why would there be any doubt that internal administrative law is law?
One reason might simply be its internal character. Agencies are not just
the source of internal law; they are also its targets. Although internal administrative law can have significant practical impact outside the agency, it does
not purport to bind private parties; again, its primary audience is agency
personnel. Agencies are also internal administrative law’s prime enforcers.
Although courts have sometimes found agency internal issuances to be judicially enforceable,89 overwhelmingly it is agencies who enforce these measures. Indeed, as discussed above, much internal administrative law is
adopted precisely to achieve this enforcement and ensure that agency and
executive branch leadership is able to exert control and oversight. Intuitively,
this dominant internal aspect may make internal administrative law feel too
distant from the external legal system to count as law (and especially so
given the still lingering identification of law with the courts).
Yet on a little scrutiny, this intuition falls apart. Each of these features—
that agencies are the source, targets, and enforcers of internal administrative
law—is compatible with recognizing internal administrative law as law. The
suggestion that agencies cannot be a source of law is particularly implausible. This claim simply cannot be squared with the legally binding effect of
long-accorded agency substantive rules and adjudicatory orders. And if we
accept that at least some agency issuances can have legal force and effect, the
fact that agencies are the source of internal administrative law cannot be the
basis for denying its legal status. The contention that norms must create
rights and obligations for private parties in order to count as law90 is equally
untenable. This claim erroneously conflates the characteristics of a particular
form of law, private law, with the more general category of law writ large. In
supra note 24 at 2004 (suggesting that notice values apply to only those action-guiding elements of administration but also ground obligation to issue prospective guidance).
88. See infra Section I.C.
89. See infra Part III.
90. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 86, at 207–08 (defining law as those norms structuring
the “citizen’s relations with other citizens and only in a collateral manner his relations with the
seat of authority”). See generally Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries 37 (Nov. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (noting that jurisprudence over
the law two centuries has expanded boundaries of law to include “a vast range of other authoritative sources directed to interpreting and applying” formal prescriptions).
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fact, much public law is directed solely at public officials; on this view, most
of the Constitution would not count as law. Moreover, as Edward Rubin
argues, one of the main functions of legislation in the modern state is to
create institutions, allocate duties and resources to them, and provide general guidelines for how those duties are performed.91 But legislation in that
modern form that does not itself impose any rights or duties on individuals;
it creates structures of public administration.92 Assuming we are not prepared to exclude that pervasive form of legislation from the category of law,
it does not make sense to maintain that creating private rights and obligations is a necessary feature of law.
Nor, finally, does the fact that internal administrative law is only internally enforced disqualify it from legal status. To begin with, the spectrum of
internal administrative law—ranging from purely intraagency measures to
centralized edicts—means that often there may be an external enforcement
dimension, in the sense of external to the agency even if not external to the
executive branch. But external enforcement in this sense is not necessary to
internal administrative law’s legal status. The idea that an entity’s enforcement of its own norms cannot be law proves too much, as it would also
serve to disqualify the common law from legal status. The common law is a
body of norms developed and applied by the courts alone. The fact that
there is not an external overseer does not bar the common law from being
law. What matters instead is that the norms be recognized as having special
force, such that an official’s defiance or failure to comply with them is
grounds for disapproval and sanction, whether or not an external entity
judges that compliance.93 For example, a Supreme Court justice’s recusal
decision is not reviewable by any external authority.94 But the rule that a
justice should not serve in a proceeding “[w]here he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party”95 is nonetheless a legal rule, and one that the
justices seek to follow.96
This, however, leaves the possibility that the combination of all three
features is too much and pulls internal administrative law outside of the
ambit of what we recognize as law. Yet as discussed above, within an agency,
internal administrative law has the central characteristic of legal norms: it
91. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
369, 372 (1989).
92. Peter Cane, Public Law in the Concept of Law, 33 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 649, 665–69
(2013) (providing an account of the place of public law within an account of law in modern
legal systems).
93. See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1929–30
(2016) (noting areas of the law in which entities judge their own compliance).
94. Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122
Yale L.J. 384, 403 (2012). In this article, Vermeule more generally dispels the notion that our
legal system universally requires an external enforcer.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2012).
96. See, e.g., John Roberts, U.S. Supreme Court, 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 7–10 (2011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011yearendreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3G7-HAK8].
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provides content-independent and binding reasons for action. To be sure,
the creation of private rights, which can be enforced by external institutions,
are features of traditional legal norms. But insisting on either of these requirements for norms to qualify as law, regardless of how those norms operate and are perceived, is to hold the category of law apart from
contemporary legal institutions and social practices. This view denies the
social practice which recognizes law as operating as a structure that organizes government institutions. Prior efforts to identify law in formal terms
have been subject to the criticism that they fail to capture the various forms
that law takes.97 We take a more positivist and functionalist approach here,
one that focuses on how norms operate within government institutions.
From such a functionalist and positivist perspective, purely internal agency
issuances, structures, and practices can qualify as law.
3. Why Law and Not Administration or Management?
Even if these internal administrative measures can be seen as law, a
question still remains as to why do so. Other scholars have acknowledged the
binding and authoritative power of internal administrative measures, yet resisted denominating them law. Lon Fuller, for instance, acknowledged that
managerial direction was a form of social ordering like law, but insisted on a
dichotomy between the two.98 Fuller reserved “law” for those norms structuring the “citizens relations with other citizens and only in a collateral
manner his relations with the seat of authority,” with managerial direction
governing “the relations between the subordinate and his superior.”99
More recently and pointedly, Edward Rubin has argued that the category of law obscures more than it clarifies about the operation of administrative government.100 He views law as beholden to a concept of regularity or
coherence that he finds lacking in the statutes that underlie the administrative state—statutes that contain a host of compromises and seek multiple
goals.101 Just as important, Rubin argues that evaluating statutes and administrative activity in terms of law privileges attainment of legal values above
all other goals, including attainment of statutory aims in an efficient and fair
manner.102 Rubin urges that “we should bracket the concept of law . . . [and]
suspend its claim to describe some aspect of our society in a useful and

97. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 38–41 (1961). Edward Rubin raises the same
criticism against Hart’s conception of law, arguing that it excludes much of law in an administrative state. Rubin, supra note 87, at 199–201.
98. Fuller, supra note 86, at 207 (“Let me begin by putting in opposition to one another
two forms of social ordering that are often confounded. One of these is managerial direction,
the other is law.”).
99. Id. at 207–08.
100. Rubin, supra note 87, at 197–207.
101. Id. at 197–203.
102. Id. at 202.
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convincing way.”103 In lieu of law, he urges us to adopt an “alternative concept of policy and implementation” to allow for a more realistic evaluation
of administration.104 Strikingly, Rubin acknowledges the contrasting strategy
we adopt here, of “expand[ing] the term ‘law’ to include the entire range of
modern governmental action.”105 But he rejects such an approach because
“many of the actions that will be included bear no relation to law’s established meaning,” risking greater confusion in understanding government.106
No doubt conceptualizing internal administrative operations in terms of
law has costs, including potentially the confusion and downplaying of policy
implementation that Rubin fears. But so does a narrow understanding of law
that excludes internal administration. Such an approach cordons off law as a
category for understanding and evaluation of the operations of administrative agencies, the dominant lawmaking and law implementation institutions
of our society. It simultaneously suggests that these core governmental institutions exist and function outside of law. Drawing a line between the world
of administration and the world of law is particularly troubling at a time
when administrative government is challenged as fundamentally unlawful—
challenges that are often premised on a denial of the very lawlike aspects of
internal administration we emphasize here, or a similarly narrow understanding of law.107 In our view, explicating the ways internal administration
functions as law is more likely to prove a fruitful strategy for understanding—and defending—administrative government than insisting on a conceptual distinction between law and administration.
Most broadly perhaps, in a culture that prizes the rule of law as ours
does, it is difficult to ground an account of administrative legitimacy without an account of how well administrative agencies embody rule-of-law values.108 Recognizing internal administration as a form of law allows such an
evaluation. Any institution or set of legal norms and practices embodies
rule-of-law values in matters of degree,109 and some traditional rule-of-law
values may seem less applicable in administrative contexts. Thus, understanding how internal administration operates as law does not preclude the
103. Id. at 203.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 208.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Assault on the Constitution and the Rule of Law (2015); Philip Hamburger,
Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 6–7 (2014) (arguing that administrative government
“runs outside the law” and “abandons rule through and under the law”). Hamburger focuses
his claim that administrative law is unlawful on the ability of agencies to bind individuals
outside the agency. He expressly excludes agencies’ ability to bind executive officials within the
agency from his field of concern. Hamburger, supra, at 4. But this just reinforces how far of a
gulf Hamburger perceives between administration and law. Despite seeing the exercise of binding force as the central concern of law, he rejects that binding within an agency raises any
lawfulness concern.
108. McDonald, supra note 87, at 201–17.
109. Waldron, supra note 24, at 44.
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possibility that such internal law may operate in some unique ways and
nonetheless be legitimate. But any effort to rethink what the rule of law may
require in administrative contexts, or how internal administration could be
reformed to better advance applicable rule of law concerns, is premised on
first understanding how internal administration functions as law.
C. The Critical Role of Internal Administrative Law
External administrative law provides important means of agency control. Congress subjects agencies to procedural and substantive requirements,
like the APA, that courts enforce.110 Congress also conducts investigations
and oversight, and further constrains agencies through exercise of the appropriations power.111 These are important levers of agency control. Take, for
example, the external law of judicial review. Grounded in the APA and common law doctrines, judicial review grants rights to relief from administrative
action that does not comply with statutory requirements.112 Moreover, in the
process, courts have at times read these requirements expansively and developed doctrines of reasoned decisionmaking to which agencies must adhere.113 As a result, agency action can be reversed for unexplained
inconsistency with published rules upon which parties have relied,114 for failure to abide by the processes set out in the APA, for lack of an adequate basis
in evidence, or for failure to provide a sufficient justification.115
External administrative law clearly matters. But just as clearly, external
administrative law alone is insufficient to yield agency compliance and adherence to governing requirements. Judicial review can provide an articulation of these requirements as well as a record of adjudications of conforming
and nonconforming conduct. Implementation and actual satisfaction of
these requirements, however, depends upon the agency’s own practices, not
110. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., supra note 61, at 468–81.
111. Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic
Policy Decisions, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 766 (2010); David C.W. Parker & Matthew Dull, The
Weaponization of Congressional Oversight: The Politics of the Watchful Eye, 1947–2010, in
Politics to the Extreme: American Political Institutions in the Twenty-First Century 47, 63 (Scott A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly eds., 2013) (describing the increase in congressional investigations with divided government).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
113. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1293 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law]. But see
Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355, 1369
(2016) (arguing that courts apply a far more minimal rationality review than usually
acknowledged).
114. Strauss, supra note 59, at 1486.
115. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117,
2125 (2016) (“One of the basic procedural requirements of administrative rulemaking is that
an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions.”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.
Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015) (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435
U.S. 519, 549 (1978)).
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merely upon how an external overseer evaluates compliance. It is the internal structures that order collective action with the agency—whether in a
hierarchical or decentralized fashion, through more adjudicative or
rulemaking processes, with detailed guidelines or broad standards, loose
monitoring or close supervision—that provide the systems through which
agencies incorporate and heed, or neglect, external administrative law.116
Part of why external law is insufficient is the simple fact that external
oversight, like judicial review, happens only episodically in agency life. To be
sure, some forms of agency action, like significant rulemakings, will predictably end up in court. But the vast majority of agency actions and decisions,
including those that lead to the adoption of a particular rule or policy, will
never be subject to review. For any given agency, much less for any given
bureau within an agency, a judicial decision validating or nullifying its analysis comes only infrequently and unpredictably. Specific features of our external administrative law enhance these limitations. Only “final” agency
action is subject to review.117 That means litigants may obtain review only of
particular discrete actions of agencies, rather than the internal programs and
structures that brought about those actions.118 But it is those processes,
rules, and organizational measures that structure the agency’s adherence to
its statutory and administrative commitments.119 Thus, even if judicial review were more frequent for any particular agency, the “final” agency action
limitation prevents courts from addressing those features that more broadly
control how agencies operate and perform their functions.
Judicial review also necessarily operates ex post, sometimes many years
after the agency has taken the action. This means that even for the relatively
few actions that are subject to review, any remedy of a violation of external
administrative law comes at a time very distant from the violation. But effective control of an agency “requires ex ante constraints on the agency (that is,
a means of restricting the agency’s decisionmaking before it actually makes
policy choices),”120 not merely nullifying them many years after.121 Internal
116. See Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1893–95; Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688, 1691–93 (2011); Rubin, supra note 64, at 2075.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 704; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891–94 (1990). Ripeness
doctrine has also served to preclude challenges to general policies prior to actual application.
See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57–61, 64–65 (1993).
118. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891 (holding that the requirement of final agency action means
that individuals “cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather
than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made”); Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1872.
119. See Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1893–95.
120. McCubbins et al., supra note 61, at 433.
121. See Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs (2011) (emphasizing the internalization of
rules and norms as being a more effective check than external controls and describing efforts
by the military to encourage such internalization, such as integrating JAG officers into command structures); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 75, 106 (2008) (noting that ex ante controls may
overcome shortcomings of ex post monitoring).
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administrative law provides that ex ante mechanism of control; it includes
the internal structure and measures that guide agency action as it develops
and allows quick intervention and rectification when an agency actor goes
astray.
Internal administrative law is thus critical for realizing external legal accountability. It is equally essential for managerial (or bureaucratic) accountability. Managerial accountability is accountability within the agency; it
represents the extent to which subordinate officials within an agency are
responsible and answerable to their organizational superiors.122 Unlike judicial review, the manager is present and part of the organization, not an
external evaluator, and the manager’s oversight can thus be relatively continuous. Moreover, the manager has power and license not merely to nullify or
sanction, but to teach, to inspire, to check, to cajole, to encourage, and to
remedy any wayward action.123 Managerial accountability is the means
through which the organization’s priorities become the priorities of the individuals within it. And internal administrative law is the medium of managerial accountability. It sets the processes, priorities, check-points,
parameters, factors and means by which managers evaluate lower-level employees and officials. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
process, for instance, is structured to ensure oversight by high-level agency
officials while also preserving independent input from agency staff, middle
managers, and outside experts.124 The processes employed for drug review at
the FDA or cost-benefit analysis at the SEC similarly combine opportunities
for staff expertise with supervision by agency leadership.125
Internal administrative law’s centrality to managerial accountability and
in hierarchically structuring the agency’s work also underlies its importance
to political accountability. Political accountability, in part, constitutes agencies’ responsiveness and answerability to Congress, through hearings, attention to congressional priorities, and the like.126 But political accountability
for agencies is also their responsiveness and answerability to the president

122. See Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, supra note 18, at 214; Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in Public
Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences 115, 120–21, 128–29 (Michael W.
Dowdle ed., 2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, Accountability]; Rubin, supra note 64, at 2122–25
(providing an account of hierarchical and managerial accountability within agencies)
123. See Mashaw, Accountability, supra note 122, at 121 (explaining that public administration regime is characterized by continuous, managerial monitoring in which superiors can
not only sanction but remake inferiors’ actions); Rubin, supra note 64, at 2075 (arguing that
agencies’ internal monitoring is essential for accountability).
124. Wagner, supra note 58, at 19–26.
125. Heinzerling, Plan B Fiasco, supra note 55, at 934–39 (describing FDA procedures); see
Jennifer Nou, Note, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 601, 621–22 (2008).
126. See MacDonald, supra note 111, at 767–70 (documenting the use of hundreds of
appropriations riders on an annual basis to overturn agency policy decisions); Parker & Dull,
supra note 111, at 52–54, 56–63 (examining trends in congressional investigations).
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and, in turn, to his or her appointees within the agency.127 Internal administrative law is essential for both. At the same time as they enable managerial
accountability, the structures of internal administrative law also provide the
means by which decisions and priorities of political leaders can be funneled
down to guide and control the actions of the agency as a whole.128 DHS’s
promulgation of immigration enforcement priorities and policies to better
control immigration inspectors and other agency personnel, and ensure enforcement aligns with the policy priorities of the Obama Administration, is
one prominent recent example of this phenomenon, but it is hardly alone.129
Although the immigration orders came from within DHS, often the role of
achieving presidential political accountability falls to internal administrative
law issued by central executive branch entities like OMB or the White
House.
Internal administrative law, in sum, has a heavy burden and a complex
relationship with external law. It is the body of law and practice for operationalizing public goals and legality constraints within an agency. It is the
means through which decisions made at the peak of the agency are translated through the agency hierarchy to have an impact on the lowest-level
employees. Of course, simply identifying this role for internal administrative
law does not mean that it always performs this job well. Internal administrative law also can be abused, with agency officials using internal issuances as a
means of avoiding external legal or political constraints. But this possibility
of abuse should not blind us from acknowledging internal administrative
law’s beneficial features and its critical role in ensuring the legitimacy and
accountability of the administrative state.
II. Internal Administrative Law and the Enactment of the APA
The Administrative Procedure Act created a default structure of administrative procedure, agency organization, and judicial review. Understanding
the place of internal administrative law requires grappling with the status
and place of internal administrative law under the APA. The APA has come

127. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L.
Rev. 1749, 1763–67 (2007).
128. See Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1925.
129. See supra notes 1–8, 12–15 and accompanying text. To achieve this effect, internal
administrative law needs to be able to bind lower-level officials, a point reinforced by OMB’s
2007 bulletin on guidance. Final Bulletin, supra note 15, at 3437, 3440 (stating that “agencies can appropriately bind their employees to abide by agency policy as a matter of their
supervisory powers over such employees without undertaking pre-adoption notice-and-comment rulemaking” and “[a]gency employees should not depart from significant guidance documents without appropriate justification and supervisory concurrence”); see also
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,103 (July 8, 1992) (stating that agencies may make “a policy
statement which is authoritative for staff officials in the interest of administrative uniformity
or policy coherence”).
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to symbolize the identification of administrative law with external constraints on agencies. But that identification, we argue in this Part, misreads
the APA and the decade-long debate that produced it.
The APA arose out of efforts at administrative reform in which internal
agency practice and organization were center stage. These reforms recognized the scope of internal administrative law existing at the time and the
possibilities for greater coordination and consistency through an increased
presidential role in administration. Two leading investigations of federal administration played a particularly important role in the lead up to the APA.
One was undertaken by the President’s Committee on Administrative Management (commonly known as the Brownlow Committee), and the other by
the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (the AG
Committee). Both of these studies recognized and extolled internal administrative law’s virtues, emphasizing the importance of internal law for improving the executive branch’s operation and the quality of governance.
Moreover, the APA itself clearly allows for a continuing role of internal administrative law, a result that its legislative history demonstrates was intended. While the APA did create more external administrative law than any
single statute had previously or has since, the statute sought to recognize and
preserve the space for internal administrative law to continue to develop
within the broad confine the act established.130
A. The President’s Committee on Administration and Management
Roosevelt’s assumption of the presidency in 1932 marked the beginning
of a dramatic expansion of the federal government. Along with that expansion came significant managerial and oversight problems.131 The complicated structures of recently created agencies and opacity of their processes
gave rise to challenges to agencies and their actions.132 In 1936, in response
to urging from public administration scholars as well as his own frustrations
with coordinating the New Deal agencies and a desire for more centralized
control, Roosevelt created a committee to study how to improve executive
branch management.133 The committee was composed of three leading
figures in public administration—Louis Brownlow, the chair, as well as
130. See infra text accompanying notes 208–221.
131. See Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administrative Management 47–48 (1971); Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to
1945, at 156–57 (1983); see also Louis Brownlow, A Passion for Anonymity 325 (1958)
(describing discussions with FDR over creation of the committee).
132. Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics
Since the New Deal 17 (2012) [hereinafter Grisinger, Unwieldy].
133. Peri E. Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning 1905–1996, at 89–94 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Arnold, Managerial
Presidency]; Alasdair Roberts, Why the Brownlow Committee Failed: Neutrality and Partisanship in the Early Years of Public Administration, 28 Admin. & Soc’y 3, 15–23, 28–29 (1996); see
also Sidney M. Milkis, The New Deal, Administrative Reform, and the Transcendence of Partisan
Politics, 18 Admin. & Soc’y 433, 439–42 (1987) (arguing that FDR was committed to strengthening the president’s power and national administrative capacity).
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Charles Merriam and Luther Gulick.134 After a year’s worth of intensive
study—including a trip to Italy to study the administrative successes of Mussolini’s government135—the Brownlow Committee issued its recommendation and final report in January 1937.136
The Brownlow Committee report did not speak in terms of internal
administrative law. Instead its lexicon was that of the newly emerged field of
public administration, with the latter’s emphasis on effective management,
efficiency, and administrative organization.137 Nonetheless, the report focused its attention on what we argue here is part of internal administrative
law—specifically, the mechanisms that enable greater policy and managerial
control within agencies and across the executive branch as a whole.138 The
urgent need to strengthen and expand such control was the report’s central
theme. In the eyes of the Committee, reorganizing the executive branch to
provide such internal control was essential to achieve regularity, uniformity,
efficacy, and above all democracy in government administration—many of
which are values often identified as central to the rule of law.139 As the report
put it, “[S]afeguarding . . . the citizen from narrow-minded and dictatorial
bureaucratic interference and control is one of the primary obligations of
democratic government” and requires “so centralizing the determination of
administrative policy that there is a clear line of conduct laid down for all
officialdom to follow.”140
Chief among the report’s recommendations was a strong call for reorganizing the executive branch to enhance presidential power: “[T]he establishment of a responsible and effective chief executive as the center of energy,
direction, and administrative management.”141 The recommendation for
which the Brownlow Committee is perhaps most famous was its call for an
end to independent agencies—for which it coined the term a “headless
fourth branch.”142 According to the report, independent agencies’ functions
should have been transferred to executive departments, with the agencies’
policy and administrative activities folded into the departments and their
134. Arnold, Managerial Presidency, supra note 133, at 89–96; Richard Polenberg,
Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government 11–15 (1966); Roberts, supra note 133, at 15–23,
28–29.
135. See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time
53–54, 93–94 (2013).
136. See President’s Comm. on Admin. Mgmt., Report of the Committee with
Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal Government (1937) [hereinafter Brownlow Report]; see also Katznelson, supra note 135, at 54 (describing the Brownlow
Committee’s admiration for Mussolini’s administration).
137. Brownlow Report, supra note 136, at 2–3.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 33.
141. Id. at 2; see also Arnold, Managerial Presidency, supra note 133, at 100–07; Emmerich, supra note 131, at 52.
142. Brownlow Report, supra note 136, at 32, 53.
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adjudicatory functions retaining independence.143 The report also recommended expanding the president’s staff, centralizing core management functions in agencies over which the president could exercise direct control,
transferring accounting and disbursement power from the comptroller general to the Treasury department, and providing the president with broad
authority to reorganize the executive branch without the need for congressional involvement.144 Although noting that some might see enhanced presidential power as autocratic, the Committee was adamant that greater
presidential control over the executive branch was essential for democracy:
“Those who waver at the sight of needed power are false friends of modern
democracy. Strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government today.”145
In addition to greater presidential supervision of the executive branch
writ large, the report advocated restructuring individual agencies so that
agency leaders could exercise greater managerial and policy control. According to the report, “It is essential to provide for direction and control of the
work of each department by a small number of policy-determining officers
at the head.”146 Included in the final report were a series of staff studies of
specific features of federal agency management, written by Arthur MacMahon, which similarly emphasized the importance of stronger oversight
within agencies. Agencies needed to be restructured so that the department
head could “deal effectively with questions of policy, both in point of formulation and of execution,”147 and “impose the coordinating supervision
which is [the department’s] prime reason for existence.”148 Put in our terms
here, agency restructuring was needed to foster internal administrative law.
The Brownlow Committee issued only one staff study on administrative
procedure, addressing rulemaking, and that study did not make it into the
143. Id. at 46.
144. Arnold, Managerial Presidency, supra note 133, at 103–07; see also Roberts,
supra note 133, at 7–10. Some of the Brownlow Committee’s proposals for expanded presidential authority, such as its recommendation that the Bureau of the Budget be moved into the
White House, reflected substantive policy goals that the Committee members shared with
FDR. See Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and
War 21–22 (1995). Central among these was a desire to provide a mechanism by which the
national government could play a stronger planning role in the economy. See Milkis, supra
note 133, at 442–44.
145. Brownlow Report, supra note 136, at 53.
146. Id. at 39.
147. See Arthur W. MacMahon, Departmental Management, in Brownlow Report, supra
note 136, at 247, 251; see also Herbert Kaufman, Administrative Management: Does Its Strong
Executive Thesis Still Merit Our Attention?, 67 Pub. Admin. Rev. 1041, 1041–43, 1045 (2007)
(describing staff reports on internal agency management).
148. MacMahon, supra note 147, at 252. Interestingly, in contrast to current debates
which pit political control and the civil service against one another, see generally David E.
Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008) (describing efforts to circumvent civil service requirements in
the name of political control), the Brownlow Committee saw no such conflict. It paired its
calls for greater presidential and agency leadership control with a recommendation that the
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Committee’s final document.149 Still, this rulemaking study displays a sophisticated approach that invoked several forms of internal administrative
law. One was in the form of administrative structure. The report urged vesting rulemaking authority in department heads, though also subject to presidential direction.150 But the report also recognized that presidential oversight
could itself be used to foster greater agency use of internal law.151 As a result,
the report emphasized that presidents should employ their oversight powers
to regularize the rulemaking process as well as “guide [department heads’]
discretionary choices.”152 In the goal of regularization, the report urged presidents to require that “each department set up a regularized procedure for
the flow of rules . . . in the course of their preparation and issuance.”153
These procedures should contain certain key elements, such as requirements
of consultation with affected groups prior to issuance; review and clearance
of proposed rules by agency lawyers, trained regulatory drafters, and technical experts; and publication of rules upon issuance.154 Of particular note
from an internal law perspective is the report’s differentiation of substantive,
interpretive, and managerial rules,155 given that managerial rules and (to a
lesser extent) interpretive rules are primarily directed at the agency itself.
The report also urged centralized clearance of rules through the Bureau of
the Budget, justifying this move as needed to ensure policy coordination
across the executive branch and consistency with presidential views156—the
same terms used today in defense of centralized regulatory review through
OIRA.157 The report thus sought to develop three distinct types of internal
administrative law: presidentially devised procedures that agencies would
govern rulemaking across the executive branch, agency-specific requirements developed as a result of presidential instigation, and a presidential
review process that would operate once agency procedures were complete.
Roosevelt embraced the Brownlow Committee’s recommendations for
executive reorganization. But the legislation he proposed incorporating these
federal civil service expand “upward, outward, and downward,” to ensure that a federal government career would attract “personnel of the highest order” and allow development of expert and permanent agency management. Brownlow Report, supra note 136, at 7;
MacMahon, supra note 147, at 265–70.
149. See Stephanie P. Newbold & David H. Rosenbloom, Critical Reflections on
Hamiltonian Perspectives on Rule-Making and Legislative Proposal Initiatives by the Chief Executive, 67 Pub. Admin. Rev. 1049, 1049–51 (2007) (discussing the rulemaking report and theorizing as to why it was not included with the other staff reports).
150. See James Hart, The Exercise of Rule-Making Power, in Brownlow Report, supra
note 136, at 309.
151. Id. at 329–30.
152. Id. at 314.
153. Id. at 338.
154. Id. at 317–18, 338–41.
155. Id. at 319–53.
156. Id. at 351–52.
157. See Exec. Order No. 12866, §§ 2(b), 4, 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–48 (1994), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802, 804–06 (2012).
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recommendations faced a hostile response from Congress.158 To some extent,
this response resulted from poor timing on the part of the administration.
Roosevelt put forth his famous court-packing plan just a few weeks after the
Brownlow executive reorganization legislation was submitted in January
1937. Both proposals fueled charges that Roosevelt was seeking dictatorial
powers, particularly against the background of the rise of fascism and totalitarianism in Europe and the Soviet Union.159 The executive reorganization
bill also ran into conservative opposition in signaling that the invigorated
national administrative state of the New Deal was here to stay.160 In the end,
even Democrats voted against the bill in large numbers, and it went down to
defeat in April 1938.161
Despite this lack of immediate results, the Brownlow Committee’s effort
to strengthen presidential powers over administration ultimately proved successful. Roosevelt himself obtained some reorganization authority a year
later in 1939, and the Hoover Commission ten years later brought about a
major expansion of the president’s administrative capacity and managerial
role.162 Chaired by the former president, the Hoover Commission was created by a Republican Congress in 1947 as part of an effort to retract the
broad national administrative state left by the New Deal and World War II.
But to the consternation of its founders, the Hoover Commission adopted a
stance similar to the Brownlow Committee.163 It too urged strong internal
presidential oversight of the executive branch, justifying centralized presidential managerial and policy control as necessary for political accountability.164 In the Commission’s words: “The President, and under him his chief
lieutenants, the department heads, must be held responsible and accountable to the people and the Congress for the conduct of the executive branch.
Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority—the
power to direct.”165 In the face of now bipartisan support, Congress enacted
158. See Arnold, Managerial Presidency, supra note 133, at 107–15; Polenberg,
supra note 134, at 28–51.
159. Brinkley, supra note 144, at 22.
160. Among other things, the bill (following the Brownlow report) proposed creating two
new federal administrative departments to accommodate the Works Progress and Public
Works Administrations, two New Deal emergency relief measures that conservatives hoped
would be temporary. Milkis, supra note 133, at 448; see also Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 Tax L. Rev. 73, 103–05 (2015) (examining the benefits of published statement of nonenforcement by the IRS).
161. See Brinkley, supra note 144, at 22.
162. See Emmerich, supra note 131, at 89–90; Peri E. Arnold, The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency, 38 J. Pol. 46, 47–49 (1976).
163. See Arnold, supra note 162, at 47–50.
164. Emmerich, supra note 131, at 88–90; Ronald C. Moe, The Hoover Commissions
Revisited 34 (1982); see Arnold, Managerial Presidency, supra note 133, at 128–29;
Grisinger, Unwieldy, supra note 132, at 154. The Commission also argued for greater decentralization of operations and standards to agencies and strengthening the role of operating
heads. See Emmerich, supra note 131, at 90–91.
165. The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government 3 (1949).
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many of the Hoover Commission’s recommendations for greater presidential and agency head control.166
B. The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure
The AG Committee pursued a different aspect of federal administration.
Rather than focusing on executive branch structure and management, the
AG Committee trained its attention on administrative procedure. Moreover,
the AG Committee was also more reactive than the Brownlow Committee.
Although also commissioned by President Roosevelt, the AG Committee was
created more to fend off proposed legislative reforms than as a proactive
move to cement presidential power.
The story of the AG Committee and its lead up to the APA is a familiar
one.167 In 1933, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed a Special Committee on Administrative Law as a means of opposing the expansion in federal government and regulation associated with the New Deal.168 It was not
until 1937, when the Supreme Court started to uphold the New Deal’s constitutionality, that the ABA Committee turned its energies to administrative
procedure.169 Fueled by perceptions of Roosevelt’s growing political vulnerability—in part due to the failure of Brownlow executive reorganization
bill—the ABA Committee put significant effort into its campaign for administrative procedural reform.170 Led by Roscoe Pound, the dean of
Harvard Law School, the ABA Committee argued for greater procedural
constraints and expanded judicial review as necessary to curb the “administrative absolutism” of the Roosevelt Administration.171 Although separate
from the debate over the executive reorganization proposal, the ABA Committee’s charge of absolutism played to similar fears that Roosevelt was seeking dictatorial powers.172
The ABA incorporated its reform recommendations into proposed legislation which was then introduced in Congress in 1939.173 The Walter-Logan
bill, as it came to be called, required hearings for agency adjudication and
rulemaking, imposed time limits on regulation, and expanded access to the
courts to challenge administrative action.174 Seeking to undermine the growing momentum for administrative reform, Roosevelt directed the attorney
166. See Emmerich, supra note 131, at 95–98; Arnold, supra note 162, at 48–50, 70.
167. For leading accounts of the background of the APA’s enactment, see Grisinger,
Unwieldy, supra note 132, at 59–108. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:
The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557
(1996).
168. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1569–70.
169. Id. at 1580–82.
170. Id. at 1585–86, 1590–91.
171. Id. at 1590–91; Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep.
A.B.A. 331, 342 (1938).
172. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1585, 1591.
173. Id. at 1582, 1594, 1598.
174. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1939); Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1582–83, 1598–1600.
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general to form a committee to study administrative procedure and invoked
the need to await the AG committee’s recommendations as grounds for vetoing the Walter-Logan bill.175 The AG Committee then spent nearly two
years, from 1939 to 1941, thoroughly investigating “how the Federal administrative agencies do actually conduct their business,” generating twentyseven monographs on particular agencies and programs.176
These monographs documented the pervasiveness of internal administrative law. Agencies engaged in extensive self-regulation, imposing procedures on themselves that were not required by statute.177 To some extent,
agencies adopted these procedures in response to judicial decisions and governing case law.178 But they also perceived these additional procedures as
important for good decisionmaking and effective operation.179 Thus, for example, agencies engaged in rulemaking regularly provided opportunities for
affected interests to comment on proposed rules, explaining that such consultation ensured “not only that the regulations may be substantially improved, but also that the tendency to violate them is greatly diminished.”180
Agencies developed informal dispute resolution processes as well as formal
trial-type procedures for use in hearings, including procedures for internal
administrative appeal and for separating hearing examiners from the rest of
the agency.181 Agencies even subjected themselves to hearing requirements in
contexts when they were not statutorily required.182 Equally significant,
agencies promulgated general policies and interpretations that they then relied on in operating programs and undertaking their other statutory responsibilities.183 Agencies also structured their operations, issuing “statements of
their own internal organization—their principal offices, officers, and agents;
their divisions and subdivisions; or their duties, functions, authority, and
places of business.”184
The Committee emphasized the importance of these types of internal
law, arguing not just that agencies were authorized to promulgate them, but
175. H.R. Doc. No. 986, at 3–4 (1940) (noting FDR had, a year earlier, a directed the
attorney general to review the entire administrative process and make recommendations);
Joanna Grisinger, Law in Action: The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 20 J. Pol’y Hist. 379, 387–91 (2008) [hereinafter Grisinger, Law in Action].
176. Grisinger, Law in Action, supra note 175, at 389–90 (quoting Walter Gelhorn, “Informal Talk” to the Department of Justice et al. (Aug. 9, 1939)).
177. Attorney Gen.’s Comm. on Admin. Procedure, Final Report 5 (1941) [hereinafter Final Report]; Grisinger, supra note 175, at 392–99, 401–02.
178. See Grisinger, Law in Action, supra note 175, at 382–85.
179. See id. at 401–04.
180. Final Report, supra note 177, at 103–05, Attorney Gen.’s Comm. on Admin.
Procedure, Monograph on Bureau of Marine Inspection, S. Doc. 76-186, at 33–34 (3d.
Sess. 1940); Grisinger, Law in Action, supra note 175, at 401–02.
181. Final Report, supra note 177, at 61, 63, 65–66, 68–69, 107; Grisinger, Unwieldy,
supra note 132, at 69–70.
182. Final Report, supra note 177, at 107.
183. Id. at 26–27.
184. Id. at 26.
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further that agencies had a “duty . . . to issue such information.”185 It also
was clear the Committee considered these issuances to be part of administrative law. As the Committee put it:
Rules and regulations are not the only materials of administrative law.
There are, in addition, the statutes . . . the decisions of each agency . . . the
agencies’ reports to Congress . . . the interpretative rulings made by the
agencies or their general counsel . . . press releases, notices, speeches, and
other statements of policy . . . and the decisions of the courts.186

The Committee agreed on the importance of judicial review, arguing that
judicial review should generally be available “to speak the final word on
interpretation of law . . . at least . . . [to] inquir[e] whether the administrative construction is a permissible one.”187 But it emphasized that “reliance
must be placed on controls other than judicial review,” including “internal
controls in the agency,” in order “[t]o assure enforcement of the laws by
administrative agencies [stays] within the bounds of their authority.”188
Moreover, “even in the sphere in which judicial review is available important
private interests must still be left to the practically unreviewable judgment of
the administrative tribunals and reliance be placed on other controls for the
fair exercise of that judgment.”189
In the end, the AG Committee concluded that little basis existed to support claims of administrative abuse.190 To the contrary, the Committee’s Final Report maintained that “[i]n the best existing practices are embodied the
fundamentals of fair administration.”191 Of particular note, the Committee
recommended that agencies increase and improve their use of internal
law.192 The Committee encouraged agencies to “stat[e] for the guidance of
agency officials those policies which have been crystallized, and which the
responsible officers need only apply to the case at hand.”193 Combined with
periodic reporting, such policy statements would allow agency heads to delegate and decentralize administration while preserving sufficient central oversight. This would also enable agency heads to retain control and focus on
those matters for which policy was undecided or difficult to apply.194 The
Committee also encouraged greater internal law development outside individual agencies. It recommended creation of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure, to ensure continued study greater uniformity, and
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 78.
188. Id. at 76.
189. Id. at 77.
190. Grisinger, Law in Action, supra note 175, at 392.
191. Final Report, supra note 177, at 5.
192. Id. at 26.
193. Id. at 23.
194. Id.
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practical improvements in administrative procedure from within the executive branch.195
As important to the Committee was that this internal law be published.
It took a strong position in favor of publication, stating “that whenever a
policy has crystallized within an agency sufficiently to be embodied in [an
internal] memorandum or instruction to the staff . . . it should be put into
the form of a definite opinion and published [for the public] as such.”196
Here the Committee found current agency practice to be wanting, stating
that “[a]n important and far-reaching defect in the field of administrative
law has been a simple lack of adequate public information concerning its
substance and procedure.”197 The Committee condemned such secrecy:
“[T]he officers of some of the agencies are controlled in their dealings with
outsiders by instructions or memoranda which they are not at liberty to
disclose. Rarely, if at all, is there justification for such a practice.”198 Instead,
once agency policy was “sufficiently articulated to serve as real guides to
agency officials,” it should be published.199
The Committee’s proposed bill recommended a number of changes in
how specific agencies and programs operated, but it did not suggest procedures or requirements that would apply across the executive branch as a
whole.200 It concluded such a unified code would be inappropriate given the
diversity among agencies and types of administrative action.201 The more
conservative Committee members disagreed with this stance, and three of
them produced a minority report proposing such a general code of administrative procedure.202 Strikingly, however, the Committee was unanimous on
the importance of agencies increasing their use and dissemination of internal law. Indeed, the Committee’s dissenting members invoked the Brownlow
Report in support of their view that “[m]ore important than any other matter in day-by-day administration and adjudication is the necessity for the
delegation of authority within an agency.”203
195. Id. at 6, 123–24.
196. Id. at 29; see also A.H. Fuller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age, 41
Colum. L. Rev. 589, 593 (1941) (commenting on the Committee’s insistence on publication
and criticizing it as too categorical).
197. Final Report, supra note 177, at 25.
198. Id. at 29.
199. Id. at 27.
200. In addition to recommending creation of the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure and requiring that rules and interpretations be available to the public, the majority bill
provided for new hearing officers to preside at adjudications and for a right to petition an
agency for a rulemaking. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1633–34.
201. Final Report, supra note 177, at 108; Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1632–33.
202. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1632, 1634–36. A fourth member also dissented, taking
an even more conservative position and recommending additional agency constraints. Id. at
1632–33.
203. Final Report, supra note 177, at 218–19.
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C. The APA
Shortly after the AG Committee issued its report, separate bills representing the recommendations of the Committee’s majority and minority
were introduced in Congress, along with a yet more restrictive measure
based in part on Walter-Logan.204 But it was not until 1946 that the APA was
enacted.205 Despite the gap in time, the APA represented a culmination of
the efforts at administrative reform dating back to the ABA and Brownlow
Committees of the 1930s.206 Still the AG Committee, and in particular the
minority’s recommendations, were the APA’s closest progenitor.207
Like the minority’s proposed bill, the APA created a set of minimum
procedures for agency action, procedures which the agencies could add to
and further specify to suit their needs. Critically, however, the APA’s drafters
did not view this legislative stipulation of minimum procedures as a rejection of agency internal law. Instead, the Senate report on the APA described
the legislation as “an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures.
Agencies may fill in details, so long as they publish them.”208 To be sure,
these minimum procedures codified the best agency practices, and those
agencies that did not yet follow these procedures would now have to adopt
them.209 But the APA only imposed a floor, not a ceiling, and it left agencies
with ample room with which to keep developing their own procedures and
other forms of internal law.
The APA contained two primary references to internal law. The first, in
section 3 of the Act, required agencies to publish their substantive rules and
internal law in the Federal Register. This included the agency’s policy statements, interpretations, and “the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available.”210 Matters relating
solely to internal management of the agency were exempted.211 Section 3 was
204. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1632–33, 1636.
205. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 500–04, 551–59, 561–84, 591–96, 701–06); Shepherd, supra note 173, at 1636–41,
1674.
206. H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 241–42, 245–48 (1946); Grisinger, Law in Action, supra
note 180, at 384, 404–08. For analyses of the political background and calculations behind the
APA’s enactment, see Grisinger, Unwieldy, supra note 136, at 59–108, and Shepherd, supra
note 167, at 1560, 1649–83.
207. Shepherd, supra note 167, at 1649.
208. H.R. Rep. No. 79-1908, at 16 (1946), reprinted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
79th Cong., Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1944–46, at
233, 250 (1946) [hereinafter Legislative History of the APA].
209. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 31 (1947) [hereinafter AG Manual] (noting that informal rulemaking procedures “have already been extensively employed by Federal agencies”).
210. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946).
211. Id. These publication requirements supplemented those of the Federal Register Act,
which had required publication of final orders, regulations, licenses and certificates. See Federal Register Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 220, §§ 4–5, 49 Stat. 500, 501 (1935).

June 2017]

Internal Administrative Law

1277

significantly altered by the Freedom of Information Act in 1946, and perhaps as a result, the APA’s original publication requirements have faded
from view and instead its procedural impositions are front and center.212 Yet
when the APA was enacted, section 3 got top billing. The congressional reports on the APA described section 3 as “among the most important, farreaching, and useful provisions of the bill.”213 In particular, the Senate Judiciary Committee report connected section 3’s publication requirement to
the fact that the APA left agencies free to develop internal law and procedures. Given that “the bill leaves wide latitude for each agency to frame its
own procedures,” publication of those procedures became “essential for the
information of the public.”214
The second internal law reference came in section 4 of the APA, which
addressed rulemaking. As remains true today, the 1946 Act imposed noticeand-comment requirements on substantive rulemaking, but specifically excluded rules relating to agency management and personnel, “interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”215 This exemption of internal law contrasted notably with
the Walter-Logan bill, which had subjected all rulemaking to both noticeand-comment and hearing requirements.216 It also differentiated the APA
from the AG Committee minority’s bill, which mandated public rulemaking
procedures for policy statements as well as substantive rules.217 This exemption from even notice-and-comment requirements ensured that agencies
would be free to develop internal law.218 Indeed, this was one of the main
reasons why Congress included the exemption. The Senate Report listed the
“desire[ ] to encourage the making of such rules” as the first reason “for the
exclusion of rules of organization, procedure, interpretation, and policy”219
from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
212. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
213. See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 12 (1946), reprinted in Legislative History of the APA,
supra note 208, at 185, 198; H.R. Rep. No. 79-1908, at 17, 21, reprinted in Legislative History of the APA, supra note 208, at 233, 251, 255; see also Ashley Sellers, Administrative
Procedure Act: Extent of Compliance with Section 3, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1947, at 7, 7 (reporting that
section 3 commanded more attention thus far than any of the Act’s other provisions).
214. H.R. Rep. No. 79-1908, reprinted in Legislative History of the APA, supra note
208, at 233, 256.
215. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a). In addition, section 12 of the APA stated:
“Every agency is granted the authority necessary to comply with the requirements of this Act
through the issuance of rules or otherwise.” Id. § 12.
216. See 92 Cong. Rec. 2135, 2150–51 (1946).
217. See Final Report, supra note 177, at 225.
218. See S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 13 (1946) (stating exemptions from notice-and-comment
rulemaking and leaving it up to agency discretion to determine what procedures to use in
issuing these types of rules), reprinted in Legislative History of the APA, supra note 208, at
185, 199; H.R. Rep No. 79-1908, at 23 (1946) (explaining that agencies have wide latitude to
continue to develop procedure), reprinted in Legislative History of the APA, supra note
208, at 233, 257; AG Manual, supra note 209, at 30.
219. S. Rep. No. 79-248, at 18 (1946).
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Thus, despite imposing external procedural requirements on agencies,
the APA also embraced internal law. It displaced internal law that directly
conflicted with its procedural mandates, but these mandates did not force
much change to existing practices.220 And beyond its procedural minima, the
APA intentionally left agencies free to develop internal law. It only demanded that agencies publish the internal law they developed.221 But the
APA’s embrace of internal law was no aberration. It reflected a consistent
recognition, traceable back to early works on administrative law through the
Brownlow and AG Committees, of the critical role that internal administrative law plays in controlling and directing administrative power.
III. Internal Administrative Law After the APA
Despite the effort in the APA to allow agencies to continue to develop
internal administrative law, doctrines that courts developed enforcing the
APA and their application of free-standing principles of judicial review have
substantially constrained the content and place of internal law. These judicial doctrines make external enforcement or even procedural invalidation a
function of how lawlike or manifestly binding the agency’s self-regulation is.
Judicial enforcement and invalidation are opposed treatments but they create similar net results. These doctrines prevent agencies from establishing
norms that purport to bind agency officials’ exercise of discretion without
also inviting courts to police the agency’s compliance with those norms. In
that sense, internal law exists only provisionally until the moment of external enforcement. Agencies now frequently cloak their internal law in documents disclaiming an intention to create a binding norm. At the same time,
as judicial doctrines have imposed these calculations on agencies, central
executive officers, such as OMB and OIRA, have imposed more requirements on agencies’ internal law so that internal administrative law now contains more norms imposed by central agencies than ever before.
This Part describes this accumulating regulation of internal administrative law that followed the enactment of the APA. We begin with perhaps the
most important of these judicial doctrines—the distinction between rules
that require notice and comment and those that do not. That doctrine confronts agencies with the prospect of procedural invalidation of their internal
law. We then turn to other judicial doctrines that trigger external enforcement of the internal law, including judicial construction of the APA’s exclusion of judicial review for decisions “committed to agency discretion by
law,”222 as well as the Accardi223 doctrine. We finally turn to central executive

220. See Grisinger, Unwieldy, supra note 136, at 11.
221. See Sellers, supra note 213, at 8. The publication of agencies’ own organization and
procedures was a massive effort, much of it collected in a single 966-page issue of the Federal
Register published on September 11, 1946. See 11 Fed. Reg. 177 (Part II) (Sept. 11, 1946).
222. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
223. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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branch regulation and more general consequences this regime has for internal administrative law.
A. Procedural Invalidation: Legislative v. Nonlegislative Rules
As noted above, the APA exempts from notice and comment several
types of rules, collectively referred to as nonlegislative rules, which include
what the APA calls interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules
of agency procedure and management.224 These exemptions mean that
courts and agencies must distinguish between those rules which fall within
notice and comment (legislative rules) and those that do not (nonlegislative
rules).
The distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules is critical for
internal administrative law, a point not lost on the drafters of the statute.
Much of the internal administrative law that agencies generate is designed to
fall within the APA’s categories of nonlegislative rules, issued without notice
and comment. As a result, the stakes for how courts distinguish legislative
and nonlegislative rules are very real. If courts take an encompassing view of
what counts as a legislative rule, much internal administrative law would
face the prospect of procedural invalidation.
The risks posed by an overly broad treatment of legislative rules are well
known,225 but so far the Supreme Court been cautious in policing this
boundary. In the 2015 decision Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n,226 the Court
struck down a relatively extreme incursion on agency internal law, a D.C.
Circuit doctrine which required an agency to use notice-and-comment
rulemaking to adopt a new interpretation of a regulation that deviates significantly from a prior agency interpretation.227 The Court firmly reiterated
that because the APA does not require notice and comment for interpretative rules, the courts were not free to require that additional procedure
whether or not the interpretation was the agency’s first or represented a
change of course.228 Moreover, the Court emphasized that imposing this
procedural requirement beyond what the APA mandates would violate the
“basic tenet of administrative law that agencies should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedure.”229 The Perez decision thus enforces the principle that under the APA courts are not authorized to manage the procedure
by why agencies develop internal law.
At the same time, however, the Perez Court explicitly declined to provide guidance on how the line between legislative and nonlegislative rules
224. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (exempting matters of agency management); id. § 533(b)(3)(A)
(exempting interpretive rules, general policy statements, and procedural rules).
225. 3 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 17.3, at 1572–76 (5th ed.
2010) (criticizing effects on agencies of overly inclusive test for legislative rules).
226. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1207.
229. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
544 (1978)).
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should be drawn.230 And the most that the Supreme Court has previously
offered on the distinction is simply a reiteration of the formal legal difference between these two types of rules: legislative rules bind third parties
with the force of law, whereas interpretive rules do not have the force of
law.231 Lower courts, when faced with the frequently litigated question of
whether an agency statement required notice and comment, have attempted
to fill the void by relying on a host of factors, such as whether the rule has
“the force of law,”232 whether the agency expressly invokes its legislative
rulemaking authority,233 the “substantial impact” of the statement,234 and
the basis for enforcement without the rule.235
In applying these factors, however, a frequent judicial reflex is to examine the extent to which a statement limits the agency’s own discretion or
binds its officials and staff. Measures that “narrow [the agency decisionmaker’s] field of vision” and are “of a kind calculated to have a substantial effect on ultimate [agency] decisions,”236 “in purpose or likely effect
[will] . . . narrowly limit[ ] administrative discretion,”237 do not “genuinely
leave the agency and its employees free to exercise discretion,”238 or show
that the “agency intends to bind itself to a particular legal position”239 point
toward the statement being a legislative rule.240
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas v. United States provides a good
illustration of this strain of precedent. At issue in the case was DHS’s policy,
230. Id. at 1204.
231. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); see also Perez, 135 S. Ct. at
1204 (declining to provide a distinction and citing Guernsey).
232. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108–09 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
233. Id. at 1109.
234. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 176 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor
v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984)).
235. See Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1111–12 (suggesting (1) whether there would be a
basis for enforcement without the rule, (2) publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3)
whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, and (4) whether the
rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule as critical factors). The D.C. Circuit has subsequently made clear that publication in the Code of Federal Regulations is not a significant
factor. See Health Insurance Ass’n v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining
that C.F.R. publication only a “snippet” of evidence). For an overview of judicial treatment of
this distinction, see generally 1 Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4, at
432–66 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the distinction between legislative and nonlegislatve rules);
David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120
Yale L.J. 276 (2010); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 893
(2004).
236. Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
237. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
238. Texas, 809 F.3d at 176.
239. Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Tel. Ass’n
v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
240. See id.
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with which President Obama closely associated himself, setting forth enforcement priorities as well as categories of undocumented immigrants for
deferred action. The Fifth Circuit upheld a district court’s nationwide stay of
the policy in part on the ground that the policy was a legislative rule and
therefore had to be promulgated through notice-and-comment proceedings,
which had not been used.241 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit focused on
whether the policy constrained the discretion of lower-level officials—in the
court’s words, whether the policy “genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion.”242 Reading the policy as binding
lower-level officials and denying them genuine discretion in deferred action
decisions, the court required notice and comment. Under this logic, agency
policies or internal law that structure or bind the discretion of lower-level
decisionmakers—as many policies for the efficient ordering of a hierarchical
bureaucracy aim to do—would require notice and comment.
On this line of thought, the more an agency’s statement structures the
agency’s discretion and purports to bind the agency itself, the more likely
the statement is to be judged a legislative rule and thus procedurally invalid
if not issued using notice and comment. But binding the agency, or more
precisely constraining exercises of discretion by lower-level staff, is one of
the basic tasks of internal administrative law. By thus requiring agencies to
structure their discretion through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
courts have deviated significantly from the APA,243 which subjected internal
administrative law only to publication requirements.
B. Externalization: Reviewability and Accardi
Judicial doctrines do not only threaten invalidation of internal administrative law; both reviewability doctrines and the Accardi doctrine treat internal law as authoring external review by the courts of the agency’s
compliance.
1. Reviewability
The APA precludes judicial review of agency action that is “committed
to agency discretion by law.”244 When courts ask whether the agency action
is “committed to agency discretion by law,”245 the governing test asks
241. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
242. Id. at 171 (quoting Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592,
595 (5th Cir. 1995)).
243. For a thorough examination of policy statement and interpretive rule exceptions to
the notice-and-comment requirement, see Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance
Exception (Apr. 4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
Levin provides a careful defense of the view that an agency binding itself, whether through a
policy statement or interpretive rule, does not make the agency guidance a legislative rule
requiring notice and comment. See id. 29–35, 65–69.
244. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
245. Id.
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whether the statutory delegation is “drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,”246 or as it also put, “drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is not law to apply.”247
The paradigm application evaluates the statutory delegation to determine whether the statute itself provides a judicially manageable standard.248
Courts have looked beyond statutory language, and concluded that there is
“law to apply” when the agency itself creates a law with respect to which the
court can evaluate the agency’s conduct, typically in a legislative rule.249 And
courts have gone further still and found that nonlegislative rules and policies
could trigger review.
In determining whether internal law can trigger reviewability, a court
evaluates the extent to which the norm binds the agency or constrains its
discretion in a mandatory way. With regard to enforcement policies, for instance, the Supreme Court advised in Heckler v. Chaney that if an agency
statement “indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that
discretion, there is ‘law to apply’ under § 701(a)(2), and courts may require
that the agency follow that law.”250 More generally, courts examine the degree to which the internal policy aims to constrain the agency’s choices:
In determining whether an agency’s statements constitute “binding
norms,” we traditionally look to the present effect of the agency’s pronouncements. . . . We also examine whether the agency’s statements leave the
agency free to exercise its discretion. Pronouncements that impose no significant restraints on the agency’s discretion are not regarded as binding norms.
As a general rule, an agency pronouncement is transformed into a binding
246. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190–91 (1993) (first citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 599–600 (1988); and then citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 410 (1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977))); see also Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985).
247. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–600 (1988); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); see also Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834–35. The “no law to
apply” formulation has some unfortunate implications, see Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 689, 705–09 (1990), but has not been
abandoned.
248. See, e.g., Webster, 486 U.S. at 599–601 (determining whether provisions of the National Security Act precluded review of statutory exercise of discretion by the Director of the
CIA).
249. See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (asserting that unfettered
agency discretion becomes reviewable when the agency announces and follows, by rule or
adjudication, a settled course of action); Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting
that “courts look to the statutory text, the agency’s regulations, and informal agency guidance
that govern the agency’s challenged action” to determine if there is law to apply). Courts
continued to treat the question of reviewability in isolation from the constitutional prohibition on delegation of legislative authority where an agency may not cure an unconstitutional
delegation by supplying a standard to guide its conduct. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n,
531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
250. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834–35.
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norm if so intended by the agency and agency intent, in turn, is “ascertained by an examination of the statement’s language, the context, and any
available extrinsic evidence.”251

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Clifford v. Pena252 illustrates the court
treating internal law as a basis for reviewability. In Clifford, labor unions
challenged a decision by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to grant a
waiver to allow a domestic carrier to employ foreign-built vessels flying foreign flags in international shipping. The court concluded that the statute
granting MARAD’s waiver authority was stated in such broad terms that it
did not provide a basis for review.253 But MARAD had previously issued,
outside of notice and comment, a guidance document listing factors to guide
its own evaluation of when to grant a waiver.254 The court concluded that
that “[t]he agency’s policies . . . have thus provided standards rendering
what might arguably be unreviewable agency action reviewable.”255 In Clifford and decisions like it, agency action that was otherwise unreviewable, as
Harold Krent observes, “becomes reviewable if the agency’s discretion is limited by preexisting agency rules, including those rules that do not have the
force and effect of law.”256
In short, to the extent an agency’s internal pronouncements appear to
do the work of internal law—to establish norms that bind agency actors, or
confine, structure, and constrain the agency’s discretion—they risk creating
grounds for external judicial review of the agency’s compliance. This is not
to say that there are no valid grounds for judicial review of agency internal
law. Agency internal law must be consistent with the governing statutory
scheme and nonarbitrary—and, assuming the internal law at issue satisfies
finality and other jurisdictional prerequisites, those requirements can and
are enforced through judicial review.257 There is a difference, however, between allowing that internal law may be reviewed for its validity and viewing
internal law as authorizing its own external enforcement against the agency.
251. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
252. 77 F.3d. 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing factors provided in Certain Bulk Operators, 25 Shipping Reg. Rep. (Pike & Fischer, Inc.) 1261, 1264 (Mar. Admin. Nov. 15, 1990)).
253. Id. at 1417 (commenting that the statutes conferred “unrestricted and undefined”
power that gave no law to apply).
254. Id. (referencing Certain Bulk Operators, 25 Shipping Reg. Rep. (Pike & Fischer, Inc.)
1261, 1264 (Mar. Admin. Nov. 15, 1990)) (“[T]he Maritime Administration has supplied a list
of factors to guide its § 804(b) judgment.”).
255. Id.; see also Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 789–90 (6th Cir.1991); Mass. Pub.
Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 852 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1988);
Padula, 822 F.2d at 100 (noting that “[j]udicially manageable standards may be found in formal and informal policy statements and regulations as well as statutes . . . .”); Chong v. Dir.,
U.S. Info. Agency, 821 F.2d 171, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1987).
256. Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and Regulations, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1187, 1206 (1997); see also decisions cited supra note 255.
257. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009) (reversing an agency
interpretive rule that conflicted with the governing statute); Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 56–57 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding agency guidance against challenge as
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2. Accardi and Ruiz
The external enforceability of agency’s internal law also arises in applications of the well-established Accardi principle. The Accardi principle
obliges an agency to comply with its own rules.258 More specifically, it authorizes a court to invalidate agency action that does not comply with the
agency’s own rules. The Accardi duty existed before the APA’s enactment
and has a foundation independent of the statute, though it can also be
viewed as enforcing the APA’s authorization to invalidate any agency action
that is “not in accordance with law.”259
The Accardi doctrine, as Elizabeth Magill argues, provides a mechanism
for agencies to make credible commitments to a self-constraining or selfregulatory policies.260 When the agency adopts policy in a legislative rule, the
agency also elects to trigger external enforcement—by litigants and the judiciary—of the agency’s own compliance.261 In this way, the doctrine reinforces an agency’s capacity to entrench its policies against presidential
preferences and changes in presidential administration; policy adopted
through a legislative rule continues the constrain the agency until the agency
amends it through a legislative rule, requiring a new round of notice and
comment.262
If Accardi applies only to legislative rules, the doctrine allows an agency
to deliberately trigger external judicial enforcement by issuing a legislative
rule and thus to precommit itself to complying with that rule or going
through notice-and-commit rulemaking to change it. But if the Accardi obligation applies to nonlegislative rules as well, the doctrine creates a cost for
agencies whenever they adopt internal law: by adopting internal law, the
agency creates the predicate for judicial review of its compliance.263 Purely
internal law is therefore precluded.
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals about the scope of Accardi’s
application to internal law. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the way in which external enforcement could affect agencies’
use of internal law. For instance, in United States v. Caceres, the Court declined to apply Accardi and force the IRS to comply with its own manual
invalid under § 706 as arbitrary and contrary to law), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-739 (U.S.
Dec. 5, 2016).
258. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267–68 (1954);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 569, 569 (2006).
259. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012); see Merrill, supra note 259, at 599 (taking the position
that the Accardi principle “is a principle of federal law when the mechanism of enforcement is
federal,” and thus a judicial gloss on § 706).
260. Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859,
873–74 (2009).
261. Id. at 874.
262. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a
New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 590–92 (2003).
263. See Magill, supra note 260, at 879 (noting that ambiguity about Accardi’s application
to nonlegislative rules reduces agencies precommitment choices).

June 2017]

Internal Administrative Law

1285

setting forth requirements for Justice Department approvals for monitoring
of conversations.264 Consistent with the long recognition of the value of internal administrative law, the Court opined that “it is far better to have rules
like those contained in the IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous
administration . . . than either to have no rules except those mandated by
statute, or to have them framed in a mere precatory form.”265
On the other hand, the Supreme Court and lower courts have also invalidated agency action for failure to comply with nonlegislative rules. The Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Morton v. Ruiz266 can be read this way. Ruiz
examined the validity of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ denial of benefits to
an individual because he lived outside of a designated reservation. The
agency’s manual required the agency to publish the requirements for eligibility, and the agency had not published its rule requiring that claimant live
on the reservation. The Court reversed based in part on this failure.267
“Where the rights of individuals are affected,” the Court wrote, “it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures.”268 In addition, the
Court concluded that the policy should have been published under the APA,
which requires publication of policies affecting individuals.269 Ruiz thus vindicates the APA’s insistence on publication of its substantive polices. But
Ruiz can also be read as imposing a judicially enforceable obligation to comply with an internal procedural manual that was nonlegislative in character,
at least where individual interests were clearly affected.270
Ruiz’s status remains unclear. In some decisions subsequent to Ruiz, the
Supreme Court has rejected arguments that other nonlegislative internal law
falls under Accardi. The Caceres decision concerning the IRS manual
postdated Ruiz, and the Court has also declined to require compliance with
a Social Security Administrative Claims Manual requirement.271 But the Supreme Court also has not overruled or repudiated Ruiz. Notwithstanding
some statements limiting Accardi to legislative rules,272 lower courts have
264. 440 U.S. 741 (1979); see also Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532,
538–39 (1970) (refusing to enforce filing requirements imposed by regulation on the ground
they were intended to provide the agency with information and did not create procedural
rights).
265. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 756.
266. 415 U.S. 199 (1974) (per curiam).
267. Id. at 202–05, 231–36.
268. Id. at 235.
269. Id. at 232 (first citing S. Rep. No. 79-752, at 12–13 (1945); and then citing H.R. Rep.
No. 79-1980, at 21–23 (1946)).
270. See id. at 235 (noting the BIA Manual was to a legislative rule and had not been
issued through notice and comment); Merrill, supra note 258, at 584 (noting Ruiz’s significance as imposing a duty to conform to even a nonlegislative rule).
271. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789–90 (1981) (per curiam).
272. See Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(concluding that it makes sense to restrict doctrine to rules requiring notice and comment).
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held that procedural rules that affect individual rights as well as other nonlegislative rules are binding against the agency.273
This uncertainty about the scope of Accardi’s application imposes deliberation costs for agencies. It prompts agencies to consider, for each exercise
of internal lawmaking, whether the internal law will be a basis for later judicial enforcement. The agency—or its lawyers—may conclude that the internal law will not trigger an Accardi obligation or may to adopt the internal
law regardless. Either way, Accardi creates a specter of external enforcement
when the agency creates internal law.
C.

Executive Branch Regulation of Internal Law

Following the enactment of the APA, central executive branch actors
have also created more regulation of individual agencies’ own internal law.
The most significant executive branch regulation of agency law and policymaking is Executive Order No. 12,866, which provides for presidential
regulatory review.274 In the spirit of the Brownlow Report, the order creates
a detailed scheme for centralized review of agency rulemaking and imposes
substantive and analytic requirements on agencies.275 By structuring the regulatory analysis agencies must undertake, Executive Order No. 12,866 may
be the most significant single source of internal administrative law for federal agencies today.276 OMB also exercises extensive control over which programs and projects agencies include in their budgets. This managerial and
policymaking control is achieved both through OMB’s issuing express internal law to which agencies must adhere in proposing their budgets, as well as
through OMB’s ultimate approval control over these agency budget requests.277 Unlike agency-specific internal law, these instantiations of internal
law are centralized and transsubstantive.
273. See, e.g., Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring the Social
Security Administration (SSA) to comply with a manual even though the manual lacked force
of law); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that Accardi’s “ambit is not
limited to rules attaining the status of formal regulations,” citing Ruiz, and endorsing Accardi’s
application to nonlegislative rules that affect private rights); United Space All. v. Solis, 824 F.
Supp. 2d 68, 83–84 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Procedural rules that affect individual rights are similarly
binding” and citing cases); see also Magill, supra note 260, at 878 (noting that courts have
applied Accardi to nonlegislative rules); Merrill, supra note 258, at 593 (noting cases in which
D.C. Circuit finds nonlegislative rules binding an agencies). It is important to note that Accardi
is not the only doctrine which may trigger judicial enforcement of internal law. For instance,
unjustified departures from guidance can be held to be arbitrary and capricious. See Manning,
supra note 235, at 935–36 (arguing that an agency would not have less obligation to justify its
departure from a nonlegislative rule than its departure from an agency precedent).
274. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 623 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012).
275. Id.
276. For an examination of OIRA’s practices of review as part of a transsubstantive jurisprudence of administration, see Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 283–86.
277. See Pasachoff, supra note 16, at 2209–23 (2016) (providing a detailed account of
OMB’s Circular A-11 governing agency budget submissions and OMB’s review of those submissions as means of control over agencies’ managerial and policymaking priorities).
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Presidents and other central executive branch actors have also regulated
the process agencies can use in issuing internal law as well as the content of
that law. An interest in greater oversight and publicity for guidance documents motivated President George W. Bush to amend Executive Order No.
12,866 to require certain guidance documents to be reviewed by OIRA.278
While President Obama revoked that Bush Executive Order,279 the Bulletin
which OMB issued to implement it in 2007280 remains in effect.
The OMB Bulletin includes detailed requirements that apply to many
forms of agency internal law.281 Like the drafters of the APA, the Bulletin
expressly recognizes the benefits of this form of internal law. When “used
properly,” the Bulletin observed, guidance documents “can channel the discretion of agency employees, increase efficiency, and enhance fairness by
providing the public clear notice of the line between permissible and impermissible conduct.”282 But the Bulletin also suggests that many guidance documents are poorly designed and implemented. It notes that guidance
documents generally receive less internal scrutiny and public consideration
than legislative rules, and are also less often reviewed by courts.283
The regulatory regime the Bulletin adopts is an interesting counterpoint
to judicial doctrine that broadly sweeps agency internal law into the noticeand-comment category. The Bulletin obliges agencies to maintain a website
with their guidance documents—the equivalent of a publication in our digital era—and imposes a host of procedural requirements for issuing guidance
documents with significant impact.284 Akin to judicial doctrine, it instructs
that guidance generally should not include “mandatory language” and imposes notice-and-comment requirements, but only for economically significant guidance and even there in a modified, less onerous form.285 Most
strikingly, the Bulletin takes a directly opposing stance when it comes to
agency staff, allowing an agency to use mandatory language when the “language is addressed to agency staff and will not foreclose agency consideration of the positions advanced by affected private parties.”286 Indeed, the
Bulletin expressly acknowledges the importance of agencies being able to
bind their employees as a matter of supervisory powers without undertaking
notice and comment.287 In fact, the Bulletin provides that agency employees
278. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3
C.F.R. 218 (2010).
279. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012).
280. Final Bulletin, supra note 15.
281. See id. at 3439 (defining guidance documents as those agency statements of general
applicability and future effect other than regulations that set forth policy on statutory, regulatory, and technical issues).
282. Id. at 3432.
283. Id. (noting the importance of these procedures for guidance).
284. Id. at 3439–40.
285. Id. at 3440.
286. Id. at 3436.
287. Id. at 3437.
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“should not depart from significant agency guidance” without adequate justification and supervisory agreement288—in effect, it creates a duty to comply with the Accardi principle imposed by the executive branch on itself.
The Bulletin expressly disavows its own enforceability in court, or its
creation of any private rights; like the regulatory review executive order, it is
truly internal executive branch administrative law, enforced only through
oversight of agencies by OMB.289 While the Bulletin does not sweep widely, it
does displace aspects of agency-specific internal law—as to both agency process for issuing significant guidance documents and the content of such
guidance.
D. Impact on Internal Administrative Law
Taken together, these judicial doctrines—the legislative–nonlegislative
rule distinction, reviewability, and Accardi—significantly regulate agencies’
internal law. They create the following matrix for an agency. The agency
may opt to formalize its own internal administrative law in the form of
legislative rule. If it does so, then it becomes a basis for judicial review and
clearly triggers external judicial enforcement under Accardi. But if the agency
issues internal administrative law outside of notice and comment, it runs the
risk of either procedural invalidation or triggering judicial review of its compliance. The more clearly internal law constrains the agency’s discretion, the
greater the risk of procedural invalidation for not employing notice and
comment or of external judicial enforcement. Indeed, the very features that
give internal law its character as a form of law—that it creates presumptively
overriding reasons for compliance by agency actors—also provide the
grounds for judicial review of agencies’ compliance and invalidation.
This matrix creates incentives for agencies to be less specific, less decisive, and less clear in their internal documents. From the perspective of internal law, those are the wrong incentives. Most directly, to the extent that
agencies craft their internal law to avoid judicial cognizance, this doctrine
undermines the capacity of internal administrative law to serve its political,
managerial and legal accountability roles. Clarity, not vagueness, is needed
for these roles. More insidiously, agency officials’ need to make sense of
abstract and vague internal law will prompt them to develop a set of understandings of what that internal really means or requires. These specifications
are inevitably less public and transparent than the official internal law itself.
While developing an operational understanding is an inevitable feature of
administration, judicial doctrines that provide incentives for agencies to be
more abstract actually widen the gap between the internal law on the books
and the internal law in action.
Tracing the impact of these incentives on agency action is difficult. Recent empirical research shows that agencies are not turning to guidance
288. Id. at 3436, 3440. Mandatory language is also allowed when the agency is describing a
statutory or regulatory requirement. Id.
289. Id. at 3437, 3440.

June 2017]

Internal Administrative Law

1289

strategically to avoid the costs of notice and comment,290 a concern many
observers had expressed.291 But the import of those studies for internal law is
less clear. These studies focus on agency action aimed at regulating the behavior of private parties. An important reason that an agency might not
switch to guidance in that context is that it affirmatively seeks to create a
national set of obligations for third parties, and a notice-and-comment rule
is the more effective means of doing so. As a result, these studies do not
specifically address how these doctrinal regimes influence agency choices
around internal law that purports to bind only agency internal agency actors. With respect to internal law, the concern is not that agencies are responding to judicial review by turning to public guidance over rules, but
rather that these doctrines push internal law out of the public eye altogether,
with agencies specifying their operational demands in a set of undisclosed
understandings. Such accumulation of private operational understandings
not only undermines the rule of law value of publicity but also increases the
risk of arbitrariness and inconsistency in administration.
Some evidence of agencies’ desire to escape this matrix comes from
their turn to boilerplate disclaimers. Beginning in the early 1990s, agencies
have included boilerplate disclaimers of both the external enforceability and
bindingness of their guidance documents.292 These disclaimers disavow
creating any enforceable right,293 imposing any legal obligation on the

290. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Rulemaking Volume and Speed, 1950-90, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1414, 1461–64 (2012) (finding little evidence for agency pivot from rulemaking to guidance);
Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119
Yale L.J. 782, 805–07 (2010) (finding that EPA, FDA, FCC, OSHA, and IRS did not increase
issuance of guidance strategically, though agencies did issue more guidance as presidential
terms waned). But cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical
Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889, 936 (2008) (suggesting that
volume of agency rulemaking shows it is not ossified).
291. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory notice-and-comment
requirements for agency rulemaking . . . .”); 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-2 (1992) (“The Conference is
concerned . . . about situations where agencies issue policy statements which they treat or
which are reasonably regarded by the public as binding . . . . [But these pronouncements do]
not offer the opportunity for public comment . . . .”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14,
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (No. 13-1041), 2014 WL 6749784, at
*13–14 (“[B]ut part of what’s motivating it is a sense that agencies more and more are using
interpretive rules and are using guidance documents to make law and that there is—it’s essentially an end run around the notice and comment provisions.” (Kagan, J.)); Todd D. Rakoff,
The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 Admin. L.
Rev. 159, 166–167 (2000) (arguing that agencies avoid ossified rulemaking processes by use of
nonbinding guidance).
292. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see
also Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries, supra note 11, at 400 (noting that particularly since
2000, guidance documents at the EPA and other agencies have included these disclaimers).
293. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.12 (2009).
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agency,294 or binding the agency to comply.295 Some courts have disregarded
these disclaimers where the internal document otherwise purported to have
binding consequences.296 Nevertheless, their persistence provides an explicit
expression of an agency’s interest in issuing internal law without at the same
time triggering judicial review for compliance with it. These disclaimers can
be seen as a last-ditch plea for the realm of internal management and
processes that the APA sought to preserve. When effective, they provide an
efficient way for agencies to retain their guidance documents as their own
internal law but only at the cost of formally disclaiming the documents’
lawlike character.
***
Central to the administrative state at its birth, internal administrative
law occupies an uncertain status today. Despite being formally protected by
the APA’s exemptions, judicial doctrine now significantly constrains agencies’ use of and reliance on internal administrative law. This result is unfortunate—not simply for agencies’ ability to act effectively but also for
ensuring the legality, regularity, consistency, and accountability of agency
action.
IV. Fostering Internal Administrative Law
Up to now, we have defended the concept of internal administrative law
and described its rise before and in the APA and its fall thereafter, despite
the APA’s sanction. In this Part, we consider what reforms are necessary to
secure the status of internal administrative law, both restoring it to its APAprotected role and encouraging its further development. We begin by considering external reforms, either from Congress or the courts, that could
foster internal administrative law. We then turn to potential internal reforms, either by the president and central executive branch entities or by
agencies themselves, to strengthen and further develop internal administrative law. All of these have potential for strengthening internal law, yet in the
end, what may be most needed is an ideological and conceptual transformation that recognizes both internal administration’s lawlike character and its
importance for ensuring the rule of law in today’s world of administrative
governance.

294. See. e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 816-R-04-006, Implementation Guidance for
the Filter Backwash Recycling Rule (2004).
295. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines
(2012), http://www.fws.gov/ecological-services/es-library/pdfs/WEG_final.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4QCW-9FKJ].
296. See Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1022–23 (concluding EPA guidance was final
agency action and invalid despite disclaimer).
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A. External Reforms: Congress and the Courts
Congress and the courts are the logical place to start in an effort to
foster internal administrative law: Congress because of its power to impose
requirements to which courts, the president, and agencies must all adhere;
and the courts because of the central role judicial doctrine has played in
undermining space for internal administrative law. A range of reforms are
imaginable, from reinforcing the APA’s protection of internal law to more
radical moves to encourage agencies to enhance their internal law. The
harder challenge is convincing Congress and the courts to move in this direction of reinforcing internal law, as opposed to simply imposing new external constraints on agencies.
1. Congress
Congress enacted the APA, and in theory Congress could remedy the
courts’ deviation from the APA’s protection of internal administrative law
through new legislation. Congress could clarify, for example, that agencies
may issue rules that bind internally without triggering notice-and-comment
requirements. More radically, Congress could significantly revise the APA’s
judicial-review provisions to have courts focus more on the adequacy of
agencies’ management and oversight systems and decisionmaking processes,
and less on scrutinizing the particular agency actions that such systems and
processes produce.297 And Congress could regulate in other ways to enhance
perceived deficiencies in agency internal functioning, through imposition of
consultation, analysis, or reporting requirements. Indeed, Congress has already done some of the latter, through general measures such as the Information Quality Act (IQA),298 the Government Performance and Result Act299
and recent amendments,300 and agency-specific requirements.301 The IQA,
for example, expressly seeks to develop internal administrative law, instructing agencies and OMB to adopt guidelines to ensure “the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by Federal
297. For discussion of how judicial review currently ignores systemic aspects of agency
functioning, see Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 9, at 1871–73, and William H. Simon,
The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 Law & Contemp. Probs. 61 (2015).
298. Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. C, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A153–154 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note).
299. Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 2(a)–(b), 107 Stat. 285, 285 (1993) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 1101 note (2012)); see also Simon, supra note 297, at 84–88 (discussing GPRA and
other statutes focusing on governmental performance).
300. GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, § 2, 124 Stat. 3866, 3866–67
(2011) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 306 (2012)).
301. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2) (2012) (requiring the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to consult with prudential financial regulators before issuing consumer protection
rules and that it undertake a cost-benefit assessment of certain requirements before it imposes
them); 44 U.S.C. §§ 3544–45 (requiring agencies to comply with cybersecurity standards and
report to OMB on their cybersecurity efforts, with OMB required to report to Congress).
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agencies” and requiring agencies to allow private parties to petition to correct information that allegedly fails to meet the guidelines.302
These measures suggest the important role Congress potentially could
play, not just in protecting agency efforts to create purely internal law
against judicial incursion, but also in requiring greater agency creation of
internal law in the first place. In practice, however, congressional intervention seems unlikely to be a successful strategy for reinvigorating internal
administrative law. The history of the APA suggests that imposing new, judicially enforceable requirements on agencies’ internal functioning will simply
exacerbate external administrative law’s permeation into formerly internal
spheres.303 If past practice holds, congressional efforts to redirect judicial
review to focus on systemic agency functioning may instead serve to open
up new areas of agency life to judicial scrutiny without any corresponding
pullbacks. To be sure, the record of judicial response to internal law measures is not uniformly in favor of judicial enforcement. Despite repeated
efforts by industry and business groups, so far the courts have not held that
the IQA is judicially enforceable.304 Still, history provides a cautionary tale
about the potential judicial consequences of congressional internal law intervention, as the express exemption of internal measures from the APA’s procedural requirements did not prevent courts from asserting a number of
controls on internal lawmaking.305 Even congressional efforts to guard
against judicial intrusion by limiting judicial review are likely to face significant resistance.306
302. Information Quality Act § 515. OMB has responded to the IQA by, among other
actions, imposing peer review requirements on agencies on any “influential scientific information that the agency intends to disseminate.” Final Information Quality Bulletin for
Peer Review, supra note 15, at 2666, 2675; see also Curtis W. Copeland & Eric A. Fischer,
Cong. Research Serv., RL32680, Peer Review: OMB’s Proposed, Revised, and Final
Bulletins (2005). The IQA has proved contentious, with critics arguing that it is unnecessary,
given preexisting agency mechanisms to guarantee information quality, and has been abused
by industry to serve antiregulatory goals. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro et al., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, CPR White Paper 601, Ossifying Ossification: Why the Information
Quality Act Should Not Provide for Judicial Review 2–3, CPR White Paper 601 (2006),
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_IQA_601.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5P9-6C9Z];
James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act—Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 521, 521 (2003) (arguing that OMB’s IQA guidelines “should
increase transparency and public participation in agency information activities”); Wendy E.
Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public
Health and Environmental Regulation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2003, at 63.
303. See supra Part II.
304. E.g., Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that no private right
of action exists to enforce the IQA); see also Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 800 F.3d 1143
(9th Cir. 2015) (avoiding addressing the justiciability issue by finding agency action at issue
not covered by the IQA); Prime Time Int’l Co. v. Vilsack, 599 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that agency action at issue did not violate the IQA and thus not deciding whether
IQA is subject to judicial enforcement).
305. See supra Part III.
306. See, e.g., Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99 (1977).
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Equally important, Congress is often unwilling to forego judicial review
and external constraints. Political theorists emphasize how judicial review
supports congressional control of agencies, by ensuring enforcement of statutorily imposed requirements.307 Contemporary political reality bears out
this point. Current efforts at administrative reform overwhelmingly seek to
expand judicial review, and sometimes congressional scrutiny, as a means of
constraining administration.308 The bills that have gained support in the
most recent Republican Congresses and face new prospects of enactment in
the coming congressional term under unified government309—the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016,310 the Regulatory Accountability Act
2015,311 and the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of
2015 (REINS Act)312—are all about expanding external administrative law.
Underlying these proposals are deep ideological disagreements over regulation and intense political party polarization. Similar partisan battles during
the Obama Administration have caused appointment delays, budget showdowns, and skepticism of career bureaucrats.313 The current period of unified government creates a prospect for the enactment of a major,
transsubstantive legislation. What remains to be seen is whether the appetite
for increased regulation of agency procedure and heightened external review
of agency action remains when agencies will be implementing policies more
aligned with the political preferences of those seeking further constraints on
administration.
307. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, Is Administrative Law Inevitable? 40–41
(Mar. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://escholarship.org/uc/item6mx3s46p [https://
perma.cc/GA9D-CKHJ].
308. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2
(as passed by House, July 12, 2016) (specifying that courts shall decide “de novo all relevant
questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and
rules made by agencies”); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2015,
H.R. 427, 114th Cong. §§ 801(b), 805(b) (as passed by House, July 28, 2015) (providing that a
major rule shall not take effect unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. §§ 3–7 (as passed by House, Jan. 13,
2015) (imposing great procedural constraints on agency rulemaking and heightened standards
of judicial review). The IQA appears to have had a similar, antiregulatory motivation. Enacted
without debate as an appropriations rider, the statute was justified on contentious industry
concerns about “bad science” and has served to increase industry’s ability to challenge information in rulemakings. See Wagner, supra note 302, at 68–69, 73–77, 95–96.
309. See supra note 32 (discussing current version of the Regulatory Accountability Act,
combining these individual measures and recently passed by the House).
310. H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016).
311. H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015).
312. H.R. 427, 114th Cong. (2015).
313. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 Duke
L.J. 1645, 1649–52, 1683 (2015) (describing contribution of partisanship as well as other factors to ongoing delays despite filibuster reform); Lauren French et al., Boehner Ends Stalemate,
Politico (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/dhs-funding-billhousevote115693.html [http://perma.cc/5WG4-3758] (describing Republican effort to overturn immigration policies through appropriations restrictions).
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More modest reforms hold greater potential to improve the place of
internal administrative law. Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell make
one such proposal, calling on Congress to institute regular GAO investigations into agency functioning.314 Given GAO’s close identification with Congress, and its familiarity with how administrative agencies function,
requiring regular GAO investigations could prove a mechanism to improve
internal administration.315 But the actual internal benefits of such a requirement would turn on nonpoliticization of the investigations by Congress, as
well as agency attentiveness to GAO concerns—both of which seem unlikely
in the current partisan climate.316
More generally, Congress could also create strong internal monitors,
able to police agency performance from the inside and in real-time, as several scholars have urged in the national security context.317 Congress has
made some steps in this direction, for example in 2004 creating the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) as an independent agency
within the executive branch to advise the president and other senior executive branch officials on privacy and civil liberties issues raised by national
security policies.318 On a more widespread basis, Congress created agency
inspector generals to police allegations of wrongdoing, and the Merit Systems Protection Board to adjudicate claims against civil service employees.319
The PCLOB and other internal monitors serve important functions but have
sometimes run into the shoals of partisanship and agency resistance.320 Even
these ostensibly internal entities lack true insider status, in that they often
314. Farber & O’Connell, supra note 10, at 1180–83.
315. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 Duke L.J. 323, 373–74 (2002) (describing GAO’s authority and congressional reliance
on GAO). GAO frequently studies overall agency performance. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-747, Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of
Performance Information to Make Decisions (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
666187.pdf [http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
GAO-13-21, Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Could Take Additional Steps to Respond
to Public Comments (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TU8V-UQY7].
316. See Fisher, supra note 315, at 374–94 (detailing past agency resistance to GAO requests and fights between the executive branch and GAO during the Bush II Administration);
Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1750
(2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States] (noting recent politicization
of congressional investigations).
317. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 63, at 54–56 (discussing how Congress creates offices
in agencies to protect important values that are not central to the agencies’ mission, the powers of such offices, and their weaknesses); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1027 (2013) (examining
inspector generals, their ties to Congress, and effectiveness as internal monitors).
318. Renan, Fourth Amendment, supra note 33, at 1118–23.
319. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5a (2012); 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1206
(2012) (Merit Systems Protection Board).
320. See Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 112, 166 (2015) (emphasizing PCLOB’s lack of
enforcement power); Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive,
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have independence protections against presidential control and are in practice more accountable to Congress.321 Indeed, it is often their external connections that arguably give these entities influence and authority within the
executive branch.322 As a result, congressional reforms of this type, though
potentially yielding important benefits for how agencies function, may serve
to reinforce skepticism about the role of pure internal administrative law.
2. The Courts
Two different lines of judicial reforms could help foster internal administrative law. The first follows from Part III’s analysis of how judicial doctrine progressively narrowed the space available for internal law following
the enactment of the APA. This history provides several ready recommendations for doctrinal revision. Perhaps most important, courts should abandon
their current approach of treating agency attempts to bind internal agency
officials as grounds for characterizing an agency rule as a legislative rule
requiring notice and comment. As argued above, that doctrinal move creates
the wrong incentives for agencies when it comes to developing and refining
their internal law. In addition, courts should limit the application of the
Accardi doctrine to the agency’s own legislative rules. That would clarify that
the agency’s choice to trigger external enforcement would follow from its
choice of policymaking form, but would not create the threat of external
enforcement as a condition of internal bindingness. Finally, courts should
not treat guidance that aims to structure agency discretion as necessarily
triggering review under APA section 5. Rather, in line with the limitation of
Accardi, courts should only treat the agency’s legislative rules as establishing
“law to apply” for the purpose authorizing judicial review of agency action.
This too would make the agency’s choice set clear: procedural form would
dictate whether the agency sought to trigger external enforcement. But the
fact that an agency has decided to cabin its own discretion—a necessary and
critical feature of administrative governance under law—should not serve to
invite judicial insistence that an agency adhere to such constraints if it concludes they are no longer appropriate. Each of these reforms would help to
restore the status of internal law that the APA sought to protect, and, of
particular importance to the Supreme Court, closely track the text of the
APA.323
The second line is more ambitious, and would go beyond judicial acceptance to judicial encouragement of internal administrative law. Currently, judicial deference is often a function of the formality of the
50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 316–24 (2015) (detailing ideological divides hampering the
PCLOB).
321. See Renan, Fourth Amendment, supra note 33, at 1119; Sinnar, supra note 320, at 316.
322. See Metzger, Internal and External Separation of Powers, supra note 29, at 444–45.
323. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (admonishing lower
court for imposing requirements beyond those mandated by the text of the APA); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) (same); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978) (same).
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procedure through which the agency acts.324 That structure incentivizes the
agency to demonstrate its deliberation and responsiveness in a given context,
but does not prioritize the quality of the agency’s overall administration.
Review (and deference) are determined without attempting to incentivize
agencies to pay attention to some features important to internal law, in particular structures of internal management, the agency’s internal deliberative
process or use of expert staff, or the extent to which the vetted its proposed
decision with internal and external constituencies. To the extent that agencies are responsive to judicial review incentives, deference doctrines could be
a useful lever to employ to foster greater agency attention to internal law.
Moreover, given that current deference doctrines are largely the result of
judicial creation, working off the APA’s judicial-review provisions, courts
need not wait for new legislation to act.325
Reasons exist, however, to be wary of relying on the courts to actively
foster internal administrative law. Judges rarely have expertise or institutional competency in identifying good internal management structures or
understanding internal agency dynamics. To the contrary, a repeated complaint laid against judicial review of administrative action is that courts have
failed to consider how judicial doctrines affect agencies internally and misguidedly sought to remake administrative agencies in a judicial rather than
bureaucratic image326 Compared to Congress, the president, and agencies
themselves, the courts may be particularly ill-suited to the task of fostering
new and beneficial forms of internal administrative law.
Indeed, the judicial resistance to internal administrative law detailed in
Part III suggests that courts may well be unwilling to adopt the more modest
doctrinal reforms described above to reinstate the APA scheme for internal
law, at least absent a congressional mandate. The judicial retrenchment of
internal administrative law reflects broader themes in the evolution of administrative law—both the anxiety about the powers of the administrative
state, as expressed by courts’ willingness to review more aspects of administrative life, and the increasingly centralized control over agencies by the
president and his or her offices. The judicial doctrines that eventually came
to regulate and externalize agencies’ internal commitments are of a piece
with other ways in which courts extended the scope of their oversight of
324. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (quoting
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)) (conditioning Seminole Rock/Auer deference on
agency’s position reflecting its “fair and considered judgment”); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (suggesting that notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal
adjudication presumptively warrant Chevron deference); Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1252, 1277–81 (2016) (providing standard of review under
Chevron, Mead, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Skidmore showing that these doctrines grant greatest
deference to the agency’s most deliberate statements).
325. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supra
note 113, at 1296–97.
326. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 30, at 224–25; Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1013, 1019–57 (2000)
(describing the “discrete pathological effects” of judicial review on agency action, including
agenda disruption and forced ossification); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1041, 1061.
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agency actions, such as expanding access to judicial review and increasing
demands for rational justification by agencies.327 The judicial warrant for
monitoring and regulating a wide swath of internal administrative law also
reflects some degree of judicial distrust or ignorance of agencies’ capacities
for self-governance. Indeed, this asserted judicial control law has a jurispathic character.328 As opposed to recognizing agencies’ practices as a form
of law on its own, judicial enforcement of agency internal law asserts that
the law is what the courts can review and see. This posture degrades forms
of legal ordering that do not create the sort of rights enforceable in court as
less than law.
B. Internal Reforms: The President and the Agencies
The limited prospects for congressional and judicial reform suggests
that internal measures, coming either from the president and central executive branch entities or from agencies, will prove critical to any project of
fostering internal administrative law.
1. Administering Central Executive Branch Law
In line with the recommendations of the Brownlow Report and later
Hoover Commission,329 presidents have increased their control over agencies
in large part through executive orders and other executive actions that have
imposed uniform internal law requirements on agencies. Such central executive branch internal law is the primary means by which presidents assert
their policy priorities, management, and supervision over agencies. But
when the operation of internal law appears in the guise of centralized executive branch policies, it takes on a more political complexion—more obviously the product of asserted political needs to control agency action than a
project of agency self-organization and commitment. Internal law risks appearing as simply a vehicle for substantive politics, not a form of law, and
especially so during changes in presidential administration. As a result, the
president’s management of these centralized policies must be all the more
attentive to the rule-of-law values including transparency, argumentation,
and consistency. There is much room for improvement in how presidents
have administered their internal law, in particular with respect to transparency, norms of reasoned elaboration, and precedent in centralized executive branch agencies.
Transparency remains a problem for the principal offices that administer this internal law—OMB, OIRA, and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).

327. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. 267, 276 (1990).
328. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40 (1983).
329. See supra Section II.A.
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Despite OIRA’s investment in a much more sophisticated “Regulatory Review Dashboard”330 with information about how many agency rules are
under review and their stage of development, its disclosures remain inadequate. OIRA’s public disclosures do not include a complete picture of the
rules subject to review; some rules only appear on it after significant delay,
some are held back from transmittal by the White House, and some items
simply never appear.331
But the transparency problems at OIRA have a far greater scope. The
regulatory review order requires that when the OIRA believes the agency’s
action is inconsistent with the president’s policies or priorities, it must explicitly inform the agency in writing,332 provide a “written explanation” for
the return of a rule,333 require the agency to identify “in plain, understandable language” changes in the rule that OIRA required,334 and make available
all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency.335 Scholars have
documented that neither the Bush nor the Obama Administrations followed
many of these requirements,336 and that OIRA review has often stalled rules
well beyond the ninety days provided in the executive order.337 This, too,
raises transparency issues. When regulations are delayed, it is often not clear,
as Lisa Heinzerling argues, which office—OIRA itself, other White House
offices, the head of another agency, etc.—is source of the delay.338 Similar
problems of transparency arise in the OMB’s exchanges with agencies over
budgeting,339 which are governed by a confidentiality norm imposed by

330. Dashboard, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov [https://perma.cc/4KE2DS2X].
331. Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 39, 42 (2012) [hereinafter Heinzgerling, Who Will Run the EPA?] (providing evidence of these problems).
332. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(F)(5), 3 C.F.R. 638, 643 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 note (2012).
333. Id. § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 647.
334. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 646.
335. Id. § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. 647; see also Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 305 (calling attention to this requirement).
336. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 305 (noting OIRA’s neglect of these transparency requirements); Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, supra note 331, at 41 (“The
Obama administration follows almost none of these rules on transparency.”); Kathryn A.
Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 700 (2016) (explaining failures
to comply).
337. See Watts, supra note 336, at 699 (describing delays in OIRA review under in the
Obama Administration).
338. Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, supra note 331, at 40.
339. See Pasachoff, supra note 16, at 2251–61 (arguing that the scope of OMB’s confidentiality requirements on the important question of how agency budget are negotiated and established sweeps well beyond what is necessary).
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OMB,340 as well as in OLC’s provision of legal advice through less formal
processes than its traditional opinion writing.341
Transparency is particularly important to internal law’s recognition as
law, so these gaps pose serious problems. Going forward, both retaining and
complying with the disclosure and reason-giving requirements of the regulatory review executive order would be a good place to start.342 That level of
transparency is also critical for this centralized form of internal law to promote, not obscure, political accountability between the president’s offices
and the agencies.
Lack of transparency is not the only feature of central executive branch
internal law that requires attention. The legal demands of justification and
reason giving also apply to internal forms of control.343 Reason giving serves
many different functions, one critical role being to provide a source of constraint. When public authorities give reasons, they make a prima facie commitment to acting within the scope of those reasons.344 This implies that
departures, changes in course, or reversals carry a burden of justification;
generally, public authorities must provide reasons for the change that respond in part to the reasons originally offered.
To be sure, the weight of the constraint of prior reasons varies in different aspects of the legal system. In traditional common law practice, precedent binds in the sense of providing exclusive or at least overriding reasons
for action for a subsequent decisionmaker, to the extent the decisionmaker
is faced with similar circumstances.345 But reason giving can also operate
more permissively—as it does, for instance, under the APA’s arbitrary-andcapriciousness standard of review.346 As the Court has emphasized, that
standard recognizes that agencies can and will change position, and simply

340. Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, supra note 15, § 22, at
1 (requiring this confidentiality); see also Pasachoff, supra note 16, at 2224–27 (providing a
detailed account of these confidentiality provisions in comparison to other budget confidentiality provisions).
341. Renan, Law Presidents Make, supra note 71, at 20–27, 61–62 (documenting a qualitative shift away formal opinions and a quantitative drop in number of opinions issued, raising
question about corresponding decline in transparency).
342. Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 305–06 (arguing for compliance with these requirements to create transparency in OIRA’s work); Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?,
supra note 331, at 43 (arguing for compliance with the executive order as a starting point).
343. See text accompanying notes 89–95.
344. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 400–01 (2012) (arguing that formal statements of reasons given to justify their regulations should guide their
interpretation); see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 641 (1995).
345. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rule Makers, in Common Law Theory
27, 28–29 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (describing precedent as providing preemptive authority over subsequent decisionmakers).
346. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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requires that an agency provide a reasoned explanation for its current approach, which entails that the agency acknowledge the change and provide
reasons for it.347
Within the executive branch, the norms of precedent at OLC have received greatest attention. This is not surprising; the case for common
law–style adherence to precedent is easy to see with regard to OLC, at least
when it engages in its traditional, formal opinion writing on particular
facts.348 The formal statement of reasons in OLC’s opinions provides ready
guidance to subsequent generations of lawyers, and OLC treats its prior
opinions as having the weight of precedent.349 In the past few years, OLC has
written fewer opinions and appears to be shifting its work more to informal,
context-specific advice.350 That informal, situational advice represents a decline in the common law model. Unlike OLC, OIRA does not currently embrace any form of precedent with regard to its past decisions in the context
of regulatory review—for instance in prompt or review letters. Nestor Davidson and Ethan Leib argue that it should, contending that having OIRA
treat its decisions as bodies of precedent would “enable[ ] meaningful reliance on the decision made, help[ ] justify binding agencies in the future, and
provide[ ] an organized way to depart from precedent when that is salutary.”351 Whether formally accorded the weight of precedent or not, a commitment to internal administrative law supports OIRA treating its decisions
as at least within the obligation of reasoned elaboration. That approach
would allow departures from prior practice, but also reinforce that OIRA is
elaborating law, not merely making ad hoc decisions. In short, the principle
of reasoned elaboration encompasses not just agencies, but also their central
executive branch overseers.
The recent change in presidential administration puts the need for these
reforms in high relief. As is true of many presidential transitions that involve
a change in political control of the White House, the new Trump Administration has made clear that it intends to significantly change substantive policy in a wide array of contexts.352 It can do so in ways that make transparent
347. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–15 (2009); see also Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016). Sometimes it may require more.
See Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (requiring heightened justification when prior policy engendered
reliance interests); Fox, 556 U.S. at 515 (requiring heightened justification when agencies new
policy “rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy”).
348. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 273; Renan, Law Presidents Make, supra note
71, at 8–12 (identifying OLC written opinions as a form of precedent-based, case-specific
common law).
349. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of the Legal Counsel, 110 Colum.
L. Rev. 1448, 1470–74 (2010).
350. Renan, Law Presidents Make, supra note 71, at 27 (showing a drop in OLC opinion
writing since 2000).
351. Davidson & Leib, supra note 25, at 299–303 (arguing that OIRA’s decisions should
be treated as establishing precedents to which it is bound).
352. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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the source of the changes and provide justification for the grounds for a new
approach, both as to matters of fact and policy choice. Proceeding in that
way, the new administration could help to strengthen internal administrative law of the executive branch. Alternatively, however, the new presidential
administration may opt to change substantive direction without paying heed
to these internal constraints and legality values, leaving any enforcement of
administrative-law norms of reasoned decisionmaking solely for the courts.
Doing so would yield the benefit of faster policy change, but at the cost of an
opportunity to embed norms of administrative legality that are important
checks against abuse of executive power.
2. Fostering Agencies’ Internal Administrative Law
The president has a second critical role to play with respect to internal
law. As the Brownlow Committee urged in its report,353 the president can
also be pivotal in fostering and enabling the agency’s development of its own
internal administrative law. Doing so requires confronting natural presidential incentives to centralize control. Presidents are held accountable for the
federal government’s operation, and thus have strong incentives to assert
control over agency action.354 Few institutional incentives push in the opposite direction, except for limited capacity, at least if increased presidential
control does not result in discernibly worse outcomes.355 Yet centralized preemption of an agency’s own processes and decision rules can have harmful
systemic consequences. It can erode the agency’s capacity to develop those
rules, and thereby undercut agency performance. Just as significantly, it can
send the message that responsibility for abiding by internal norms of constraint is merely a matter of compliance with executive directives, not ultimately and inevitably an agency responsibility.
The challenge is finding a mechanism to force active deliberation about
the appropriate balance between imposing central executive branch norms
and allowing space for agencies to develop their own internal law. More
sustained and structured engagement with the balance between decentralization and devolution of internal administrative law is needed. Existing executive orders and executive branch policy do not require that the White House
explicitly assess either how centralization contributes to the president’s capacity to supervise agency implementation or how centralization undermines agencies’ own incentives to self-correct and innovate with regard to
their internal law. As a result, the costs and benefits of centralization now
register at best in ad hoc ways, through successes or observed failures.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 136–146.
354. Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in The New Direction in American
Politics 235, 244–45 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
355. David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Bureaucracy, 1946–1997, at 4, 25–27 (2003) (noting that
presidents are held accountable for “the success or failure of the entire government” and for
their performance as managers of federal bureaucracy).
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Public law has adopted a variety of mechanisms to try to provide greater
deliberation about the effect of centralizing—usually through federalizing—
that could provide models for the executive branch. At one extreme are analysis and consultation requirements. For instance, several executive orders
require agencies to consult with state, local, and tribal officials before “imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly” affect those entities,
and to assess and minimize those effects.356 These requirements aim to ensure that agencies are actively engaged with states and give states the responsibility of persuading an agency that greater centralization is not required.
More demanding protections are also used. For instance, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1999 subjects a bill to a procedural objection in the
legislative process—a point of order—if the bill imposes costs above an inflation-adjusted threshold on states.357
A similar requirement of assessing and potentially minimizing the impact of centralization on agency internal law could be imposed on central
executive branch actors. To be sure, the two contexts are notably distinct.
Constitutional federalism principles underlie these requirements that agencies assess and minimize the impact of their actions on states. By contrast,
the Constitution arguably demands a certain degree of central executive
branch supervision of agency action; here, constitutional values may weigh
in favor imposition of burdens, not against.358 Still, the constitutional concern with supervision of federal power also mandates internal oversight and
control mechanisms within agencies themselves.359 Moreover, having to justify centralized requirements would provide the president an important opportunity to deliberate about and articulate what constitutional supervision
requirements entail, at both the presidential and agency levels.360 The president thus has responsibility not only to model adherence to executive branch
internal law, but also to expressly evaluate the costs and benefits of greater
centralization or decentralization of internal administrative law.

356. Exec. Order. 12,866 §§ 1(b)(9), 5–6, 3 C.F.R. 638–40 (1994) (stating principle of
regulations and requiring consultation and authorizing review to ensure reduction of burdens
of federal regulation on state, local, and tribal entities), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note
(2012); see also Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693–94 (May 20, 2009) (requiring agencies to fully consider the
legal bases for their actions and state prerogatives before preempting state law); Exec. Order
No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999) (requiring that federal regulation allow maximum possible
discretion to states and generally requiring that federal regulation no unduly trammel on state
prerogatives).
357. 2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2) (2012).
358. For an argument articulating this structural constitutional principle, see Metzger,
Duty to Supervise, supra note 9.
359. Id. at 1879–82.
360. See id. at 1925–29 (describing need for engagement on the proper scope of presidential supervision, in both the courts and executive branch).
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3. Agency Self-Reform
A final yet essential mechanism for fostering internal administrative
law—and its role in establishing legitimacy—depends upon the agency.
Agencies already generate a vast amount of internal administrative law, as
detailed above.361 Agencies do so because internal administrative law is essential for them to be effective in performing their functions and achieving
their policy goals. Agency leaders’ desire to control lower-level agency personnel provides them with an additional reason to generate internal law. But
internal administrative law can also serve as a means by which lower-level
staff can inform, influence, and potentially constrain their political leaders.
A prime example here are no-action letters, used extensively by the SEC and
other agencies; generated by staff and rarely vetted beforehand by the
agency’s commissioners, such letters are a means by which staff can bring
pressing issues to the commissioners’ attention along with the staff’s suggestions on how to proceed.362 More pointedly, staff can rely on past letters and
other issuances, or statements of existing practice and policy, to resist efforts
by new agency heads to change approach or influence the direction of the
agency on open questions.363 Internal review and complaint mechanisms
and day-to-day managerial supervision can serve the interests of personnel
throughout the agency, in flagging issues that need more attention and identifying performance weaknesses.
In sum, agencies have no shortage of reasons to generate internal administrative law. But that does not mean that agencies have the same incentives to ensure that the measures they generate score high on rule-of-law
metrics, such as regularity, coherence, and justification.364 Agencies generally
identify the statutory and regulatory authorities for their actions. But agencies do less well on other fronts, such as transparency, clarity, and consistency. To some extent, these failures are a reflection of the doctrinal
developments discussed in Part III. For example, it seems unlikely that in
practice CIS inspectors would have discretion to deny deferred action to
immigrants who met DAPA’s criteria,365 but DHS likely denied DAPA’s
binding character for fear of triggering notice-and-comment requirements.
Yet agencies may deviate from rule-of-law values for less acceptable reasons. They may forego clarity and publicity in order to avoid having to defend their policies and decisions, or to preserve maximal room to maneuver
in the future. They may seek to exploit loopholes to avoid procedural burdens, such as packaging measures that impose new legal requirements on the
361. See supra Section I.A.
362. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Subdelegating Powers 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors) (describing how internal SEC rules have delegated decisionmaking authority to subordinates within the agency).
363. See id.
364. See supra text accompanying note 87.
365. See Barkow, supra note 16, at 1156 (suggesting as much).
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public as interpretive rules or policy statement.366 Moreover, presidential
policy priorities play a major role in agency decisionmaking—a role that has
become more significant in the face of legislative gridlock and greater presidential turn to administration to advance policy goals, and may not wane
even in a period of unified government.367 Yet agencies rarely acknowledge
presidential involvement or the impact of presidential preferences in their
justifications for their actions.368
Such deficiencies are problematic not simply because they make agency
action seem legally illegitimate and less “lawlike.” Equally important, when
agencies are not forthright about the nature and reasons behind their actions, they lose an opportunity to engage publicly on the nature of law in the
administrative realm or to push back at the equation of law with external
constraint. Instead, agencies play into the narrative of administration as unprincipled and unlawful, making imposition of external administrative law
seem all the more pressing. Hence, an essential element for fostering internal
administrative law will be for agencies to ensure that their internal law meets
the highest standards of transparency and reasoned elaboration by engaging
openly about the nature of law within the administrative state. That approach may well open agencies up to external attack; agencies that openly
acknowledge how resource constraints, constituency interests, and presidential politics factored into their actions are likely to face legal challenges and
congressional investigation. But external constraints will likely result even if
agencies hide the internal factors that bind and guide their decisions, as
courts and Congress turn to external means to impose legality on the administrative state.
C. Internal Administrative Law and Political Culture
These reforms hold potential to strengthen internal administrative law.
Fundamentally, however, a deeper transformation is needed. Underlying the
courts’ resistance to internal administrative law lies distrust of administrative governance. Efforts to constrain internal law through judicial review are
of a piece with the courts’ broader development of administrative law. Long
animated by fears of agency capture and constitutional concerns of unchecked administrative power, the courts expanded judicial review and procedural constraints on agencies over the last fifty years.369 In recent years,
366. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
367. Kagan, supra note 74, at 2344–45; Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States,
supra note 316; see also Farber & O’Connell, supra note 10.
368. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1146-59 (2010); Katherine A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 23-26 (2009) (providing examples of agencies
not disclosing political influences in justifying their decisions).
369. See Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, supra note 113, at 1295,
1298–1305; Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
the United States, in Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance
317, 318–22 (Christopher Forsyth et al. eds., 2010).
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this distrust of administrative government has become explicit in the judiciary, with several justices invoking “the danger posed by the growing . . .
administrative state”370 and administrative “arrogation of power,”371 to justify refusals to defer to administrative determinations.
But distrust of administrative agencies is by no means limited to the
courts. Congress has repeatedly fulminated against administrative agencies
in oversight hearings and proposed bills requiring greater scrutiny of administrative action.372 Many recent political attacks on agencies have a decidedly
partisan cast and frequently appeared to be fueled by Republican opposition
to Obama Administration initiatives.373 Particularly given the extent to
which administrative agencies are now a critical and well-established part of
the nation’s institutional firmament, it is important not to exaggerate the
extent of opposition to national administrative government.374 Still, the antiadministration meme has deep roots in American political culture,375 and as
370. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217–21 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment) (arguing that Seminole Rock/Auer deference to agency interpretations of agency
rules undercuts necessary judicial checks on executive power and is at odds with separation of
powers); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 44 (on file with authors) (characterizing these concurring
and dissenting opinions as “rest[ing] on the overriding fear that the executive will abuse its
power”).
371. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
372. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Julie Hirschfield Davis, Move to Fight Obama’s Climate
Plan Started Early, N.Y. Times (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/obamaunveils-plan-to-sharply-limit-greenhouse-gas-emissions.html (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (describing attacks on EPA’s Clean Power Plan for “blatantly disregard[ing] the rule of
law” and having been “drawn up by radical bureaucrats”); David Montgomery & Alan Blinder,
States Sue Obama Administration Over Transgender Bathroom Policy, N.Y. Times (May 25,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/us/states-texas-sue-obama-administration-overtransgender-bathroom-policy.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (noting challenges
to the Department of Education’s transgender student guidance as “so far beyond any reasonable reading of the relevant congressional text such that the new rules, regulations, guidance
and interpretations functionally exercise lawmaking power reserved only to Congress”); see
also supra text accompanying note 270. For a leading example of scholarship in this vein, see
Hamburger, supra note 107.
373. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Republican Governors Signal Their Intent to Thwart
Obama’s Climate Rules, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/
republican-governors-signal-their-intent-to-thwart-obamas-climate-rules.html (on file with
the Michigan Law Review) (noting that lawsuit against Clean Power Plan was brought by Republican governors and that congressional Republicans were urging Republican state leaders to
oppose the plan); Reid Wilison, Red States Push Back on Federal Transgender Guidance, Morning Consult (May 18, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/05/18/red-states-push-backfederal-transgender-guidance [https://perma.cc/6FQC-SS8Z] (describing conservative opposition to DOE transgender guidance).
374. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 370, at 54 (noting that these dissents and concurrences do not have “any great prospect of becoming the law any time soon”).
375. See Rubin, supra note 64, at 2, 114–19; Jeremy Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative
Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 718–22 (2016) (book review).
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the 2016 presidential election cycle illustrates, retains political salience. Attacking federal agencies, in addition to the regulations they produce, is popular. From this perspective, the idea of internal administrative law is an
oxymoron. The forces of internal administration act in an unprincipled selfaggrandizing fashion, and external constraints are essential to preserving
separation of powers and the rule of law.376
As a result, preservation of space for internal administrative law requires
a deeper ideological and conceptual transformation than political or judicial
reforms can provide. It entails acknowledging the legal character of internal
administration and the central role that internal administration plays in preserving the rule of law. That, in turn, requires rejecting the false idea that
external enforcement is essential to law.377 It also necessitates more forthright legal and political acknowledgement of the inevitability and constitutionality of administrative agencies, for once we acknowledge that we live in
an administrative world, the need for internal administrative law becomes
apparent. In short, to appreciate and protect internal administrative law, we
must appreciate and affirm the need for administrative government.
Conclusion
Our defense of internal administrative law is conceptual, historical, and
reformist. At a conceptual level, internal administrative law plays a critical
role in connecting the values and ambitions we hold for administrative government with its practice; it is the set of internal structures that implement
basic commitments to legality and political accountability within administrative agencies. In this way, internal and external law can operate synergistically: internal law implements external law within the agency. Moreover,
despite the absence of judicial enforcement, these internal structures and
norms operate as a form of law—a system of internal constraints of importance equal to the external administrative law of courts and legislation. The
scope of administrative agency activity that never darkens the door of a
court simply highlights the cost of neglecting internal structures and treating
the court’s review as the central moment of administrative law.
The history of internal administrative law prior to and following the
enactment of the APA provides a cautionary tale on the role of legislation in
structuring the complex relation between internal and external administrative law, and the ways in internal administrative law remains vulnerable to
external administrative law. Prior to the enactment of the APA in 1946, external administrative law took the form of a few area-specific statutes and an
accumulating set of judicial doctrines working in company with nonstatutory causes of action. Such predominantly judicial external law made no
pretense of addressing internal agency life. Instead, it focused on scrutinizing
376. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–22 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339–42 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
377. See supra Section I.B.
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the legality of agencies’ ultimate decisions and actions. As a result, it neither
swept aside internal law nor created external enforcement of the wide array
of internal agency policies and processes. The situation changed with the
introduction of the APA which, despite its protection of internal law, provided multiple occasions for courts to consider the internal workings of
agencies and gave judicial review a solid statutory foundation. With that
foundation, little held courts back from drawing more aspects of internal
agency life and systems of accountability into their purview. They preempted and displaced internal law, and increased the costs for agencies to
create internal administrative law.
This history prompts question of reform: How can we foster and protect
internal administrative law within a legal culture that has come to prioritize
external law? As Congress has shown little appetite or capacity for protecting
spheres of agency autonomy, the key actors in creating a space for internal
administrative law will be the president and the courts, whose tendencies
towards greater centralization or expansions of judicial review exact significant costs to administrative legality and accountability. In this sense, we
show the costs of externalization and the need for deliberation on the appropriate balance of central and agency-specific administrative law. Agencies,
too, have a role and challenge: given their unique place as both the source
and target of internal law and their responsiveness to political change, they
have a special burden in striving to organize their internal operations in
accordance with the highest values of law. This embrace of internal administrative law, and its agenda of reform, redirects the project of administrative
law towards its foundation as a field that seeks to comprehend the operative
constraints on administrative institutions, not only those imposed from
outside.

